

Bender Geek
ELMER DAVIS ON TRUMAN

(Page 17)

February 3, 1953 25c

The

Reporter

UNIVERSITY
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PERIODICAL
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**Bookkeepers...
Bakers...
and Busy
Dressmakers...**



Americans Are Rolling Up Their Sleeves!

**YES, ALL KINDS OF PEOPLE
ARE GIVING BLOOD SO THAT
OUR WOUNDED MAY LIVE!**

• Today, the blood of a Boston bookkeeper may be flowing through the veins of a wounded kid from a Kansas farm . . . the blood of a pretty Southern housewife may have saved the life of a grizzled leatherneck. For, blood is blood, a God-given miracle for which there is no substitute . . . and when a man's life hangs in the balance and blood is needed, there is nothing else to take its place!

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
But—

**WHAT HAPPENED
TO THAT PINT OF
BLOOD YOU WERE
GOING TO GIVE?**



Call Your American Red Cross Today!





THE REPORTER'S NOTES

Stocking the Fisheries

Distance sometimes lends journalistic enchantment. The *New York Times*, which recently devoted dozens of excited articles to the arch seventy-word Stalin-to-Zarubin-to-Reston flirtation with "peace," has, interestingly enough, devoted no space to something much more specific and closer to home—namely the new "line" of the American Communist Party. True, this was all too easy to obtain, it having been in the Sunday *Worker* for December 28, 1952, which was purchasable at quite a number of newsstands. What is true of the *Times* in this case is largely true of the American press, which generally leaves the reading of the *Daily Worker* to Senators McCarthy and McCarran and to the patient archivists of Congressional committees or of the FBI.

Admittedly the *Worker* makes tiresome reading and its style is about as sparkling and intoxicating as dishwater. But after all, we can find there, written in what is nearly English, printed in New York, N. Y., the only description of that shift of party line that has taken place in every country where there are organized comrades. And why, may we ask, should we have these nuisances—the Communist Party and the *Daily Worker*—if the press doesn't pay any attention to them, or if it notices a Communist only when he has turned professionally ex?

Anyway, here is a summary of the *Worker's* pronouncements: The American Communist Party, first of all, did the right thing in supporting Vincent Hallinan in the 1952 election. But it had made a grievous error in supporting the Progressive

candidate Wallace in the 1948 election without first assuring itself that Wallace would have a mass following. Then, in explaining its correct Hallinan action, it listed all the grievous errors it made in supporting this same Progressive candidate Hallinan in the 1952 election.

Briefly, the American comrades have been ordered to drop the Progressive Party and to concentrate on infiltrating the Democratic Party, the key trade unions, the CIO's Political Action Committee, the AFL's Labor League for Political Education, the Liberal Party, the Americans for Democratic Action, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, and the like.

This is quite an order. Men like Dubinsky and Berle in the Liberal Party, like Reuther in the CIO, and the leaders of the A.D.A. have good noses for smelling out the comrades. Even the national leaders of American Communism cannot be as stupid as this program indicates. They must know that they will have a hard time infiltrating the very organizations that they have reason to hate the most. But short of active effective infiltration, the best the Communists can do to harm these organizations is to announce their intention of infiltrating them.

The fisheries are stocked for the big fishing expedition of the Congressional investigating committees and of like-minded vigilante groups. All the specific causes that these committees and these groups loathe the most are dutifully listed in the *Worker*: opposition to the McCarran Act and the Taft-Hartley Law, criticism of the G.O.P.-Southern Democratic coalition, etc. The Communists have not only restocked the fisheries, but they have provided the fishermen with new nets. From now

on, anybody belonging to the PAC, A.D.A., et al., or advocating any of the causes listed above, will be confronted with a *Worker* clipping "proving" how he is following the Communist line.

We would not say, of course, that there is actual co-operation between those who stock the fisheries and the fishermen. We have no taste for discovering "singular affinities" among those with whom we disagree. But a relationship of a sort exists—an antagonistic, of course, yet obvious—a relationship like the one between the dough that gives bulk to the bread and the yeast that leavens it.

Shadow Diplomacy

Ever since 1945 it has been obvious that Soviet delegates come to an international conference not to reach an agreement but to do everything possible to prevent an agreement. It has been so at every conference and at all United Nations sessions, and it has been the same with the Communist negotiators at the Korean truce talks.

The first postwar victim of Soviet nonagreement was Secretary of State Byrnes, in his 1945 conference with Molotov in Moscow. Byrnes, a man skilled in high-level negotiations, went to the conference geared for coming to an understanding with the Soviets as soon as possible. All his experience and training had been in that direction. What he did not suspect was that Molotov and his associates had been trained in the contrary process of *not* reaching an agreement.

BYRNES has never been the same since. Later American negotiators, such as Marshall, Jessup, and Acheson, also had their fill of frustrations in dealing with the Soviets. As for American delegates to the

United Nations, they have had to put steel into their souls in order to be able to listen patiently to the long hours of propaganda invective in which the Soviet delegates always indulge. It is evident that their purpose is to waste the West's time and strength.

So it's a problem of what to do in any matter involving the Soviets or their satellites. Impatient people have suggested that the only good method is to refuse to have any dealings with them. "Expel them from the United Nations," they say. Such treatment would, of course, afford the Communists a propaganda field day in those areas of the world where they are still not known for exactly what they are. It would be represented as the suppression of free speech not to allow the Soviets a forum where they would be free to abuse and malign everyone as they will.

THREE IS another method of dealing with them. That is the shadow method.

In the earlier days of autocratic east European régimes (as if there weren't any now in eastern Europe) there was a celebrated journalistic institution known far and wide as the "shadow board of editors." Papers which were combating a régime were always in a position where the régime's secret police might descend upon them, close the plant, and arrest the editors and contributors. To

forestall such a disaster, these rebel papers usually maintained a shadow staff of editors.

Actually these shadow editors were merely dummies who had volunteered, for the sake of the common cause, to let themselves be arrested as the editorial culprits—and to serve time in prison too. Meanwhile, the real editors were always at liberty to continue their work.

IN THE same way, but inverting the order, the United States could set up a staff of shadow negotiators and debaters, and send them to all United Nations meetings and to all international conferences to which the Soviets send delegates on the pretext of wanting to conclude an agreement. In this case, obviously, it would be the shadow men who would be sent in against the Soviet delegates. These should be men without nerves, never in a hurry, conditioned by training or habit never to agree on anything.

Some might complain, of course, that the United States was descending to the same level as the Soviets, but it could be thoroughly explained to the critics by our own information services that we were simply wearing down the Soviet bores, and that this was necessary policy, not an indication of our character.

AFTER ALL, men like Vishinsky and Gromyko, whatever their official titles, are shadows too. They are not

really Foreign Ministers, diplomats, makers of foreign policy, concluders of treaties. They have no such powers. Actually they are simply Soviet dummies, authorized only to block, disagree, object, and fulminate at international meetings and conferences. They should be recognized and regarded as such, and should not be honored with the time and thought of our Secretaries of State, our United Nations delegates, our negotiators. Whenever these men appear, let us throw in our shadow delegates to cope with them, and let us save our statesmen for times and occasions when there is really some chance of agreeing on something.

FOR our purpose, some old time-honored Southern filibusterers would do very well as shadow delegates. And, since the Eisenhower Administration is devoted to the principle of teamwork, it might borrow its strategy from the football tactics of the late Knute Rockne of Notre Dame and of his eminent successor Frank Leahy. Rockne, you may remember, always maintained three equally powerful teams on his Notre Dame squad. Often he would throw in a man for just one play, and in that play the man gave his all. When the opposition was sufficiently softened, so that a real play for a touchdown could be made, he would unleash either Secretary of State Harry Stuhldreher or Secretary of State Don Miller, and send him streaking down the field to conclude negotiations for an eighty-yard touchdown. Coach Eisenhower could do this against the Soviet team.

Come to think of it, we don't need to go to the filibustering South for a chief shadow delegate. How about Senator Joseph R. McCarthy (R., Wisconsin)? It is hard to believe that since the man exists, no useful function can be found for him in the universal order of things. Here is perhaps the role for which he was born.

When the Soviet team, including Coach Stalin, is all worn out by McCarthy, we can send John Foster Dulles for a long run around the Iron Curtain. But we certainly shall object to seeing Dulles ground down in the all too familiar Soviet scrimmage and party-line play.

INAUGURATION

Two men, two men in an open car,
The one who lost, the one who won,
The one beginning, the other done,
Two men in an open car.

Two men, two men who smile and wave,
The one in peace, the other in pride,
The two with humbleness inside,
Two men who smile and wave.

God bless the old, God save the new,
The one who lays his burden down,
The one who wears the heavy crown,
God bless and save the new.

—SEC

CORRESPONDENCE

WRONG ADJECTIVES

To the Editor: In the January 6, 1953, *Reporter* you advise your readers that you have been confused with another *Reporter* listed by the California Un-American Activities Committee.

To quote your own words, "To put an end to this silly and tiresome business . . . we print the following letter." You then follow with a letter from Representative John S. Wood, of the House Un-American Activities Committee, which assures your readers that your magazine is not the one on their subversive list.

I wish to take exception to the adjectives "silly" and "tiresome." They should be "dangerous" and "undemocratic." For the arbitrary listing of papers and organizations as subversive is a dangerous and undemocratic business; and a journal such as yours should fight it and not condone it by publishing letters from those who make the lists.

Some day, you may not be given a clean bill of health, though you may still be unsympathetic to Stalin and Communism.

DANIEL JACOBY
East Williston, New York

WIRETAPPING

To the Editor: The quotation in your issue of December 23 from Justice Brandeis's dissenting opinion on the Olmstead case was well selected, but to it should be added his further observations on the evils of wiretapping, especially by government agencies:

"Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or ill, it teaches the whole people by example. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a law-breaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means—to declare that the government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal—would bring terrible retribution. . . ."

"The makers of our Constitution . . . sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions, and their sensations. They conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. . . ."

R. F. BAUERLE
Raleigh, North Carolina

To the Editor: You are to be congratulated on bringing before the public something as well executed, complete, and much needed as your articles on wiretapping (*The Reporter*, December 23, 1952, and January 6, 1953), a practice certainly worthy of all the indignation we can summon.

But isn't it possible that your editorial

comment, while reasonable as far as it goes, is just a bit short of the mark? It would appear to me that eavesdropping is a determinant, not a determinant, of social malaise. Perhaps *Nineteen Eighty-Four* could be postponed by outlawing the symptoms and even a short reprieve would be worth the effort, but the situation would be much healthier if the practice were to die out for sheer lack of gain. By this I do not mean a resort to circumspection in private communication, but the achievement of such a general and genuine frankness that surreptitious listening in would be absurd.

To the point is the story (probably apocryphal) about Winston Churchill at a conference with Stalin. While making some of his typically pointed remarks in his private quarters, he was warned that he might be overheard. Instead of silencing him, the cautioning caused his language to become really fierce. After all, what did he have to hide?

CLIFFORD E. SAUGSTAD
Minot, North Dakota

(During the last four years I spent in Italy my telephone was constantly tapped, and although I seized the opportunity to utter the profanest expressions I could think of against Mussolini, as far as I know all my berating did not shake the Fascist régime one bit.—M. A.)


COMMUNIST TRICKERY?

To the Editor: The high regard held in certain political quarters for the testimony of so-called ex-Communists has degraded our FBI and other security agencies as being incompetent to cope with Communist intrigue and treason. This is not only ridiculous, but it raises the very pertinent point that the Commies may have planned these "conversions" to religion and respectability in order to create a wave of hysteria in the minds of the gullible to promote disunity in the United States. This could be a first step in a bloodless campaign toward Communist world supremacy. If so-called ex-Communists are permitted to surround a lie with a pretense of having accepted religion, every security agency in this land is discredited, and we are at the mercy of Moscow.

When we give these slimy so-called ex-Communist agents political sanctuary, facilities of the press, a big build-up in political circles, and general credibility before Congress and the courts, we provide them with accomplishments in effective intrigue and subversion that Moscow could never hope to equal without such grand co-operation. The bloodless campaign to divide and conquer America is made a success by our own efforts and handed to Moscow on a silver platter with all the trimmings.

J. FRANK LINDSEY
Chicago

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The Reporter

A FORTNIGHTLY OF FACTS AND IDEAS

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
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WHO— WHAT— WHY—

WHEN this issue appears, the no man's land between the old and the new Administrations will at last have been crossed. We know already that the Eisenhower Administration has called upon the talents of big businessmen to run some of the major agencies of government. We know their names and the nature of their past experience, but we must wait before we can know how these men will develop when faced with the responsibility of power.

But the fact is that these big businessmen have been wielding not only economic but also political power for a long time. They have not simply been providing the nation with useful commodities; they have also had to impress on the people at large the usefulness of their functions and to appeal to the people as if they depended on the people's votes. This process, a political process, is called public relations.

In many of its aspects big business is a sort of private government. What are the basic things that these men who have been successfully running private governments must learn in order to run the government of the United States? For between the two the difference is not one of size alone but of quality. This is the problem we asked **A. A. Berle, Jr.** to tackle. We know of no better authority. He has been in government—Assistant Secretary of State from 1938 to 1944. As a young man he served with the American delegation at the Versailles Peace Conference. He has been a diplomat—Ambassador to Brazil. As if that were not enough, he has also been professor of corporation law at Columbia Law School since 1927, and it can be said that he has devoted a lifetime to studying our gigantic corporate structures in their relation to the country's life. His book, *The Modern Corporation and Private Property*, is justly considered a classic, and he is now at work on a study of the corporation and the state. He has approached the subject with an attitude devoid of partisanship which is wholly shared by *The Reporter*.

BUT what of the leader of the biggest of all businesses—the U.S. government? We have known Eisenhower the wartime general and Eisenhower the candidate. For four years we are now going to see Eisenhower the President—but we have not yet forgotten Eisenhower the candidate. What was Eisenhower like in that curious in-between period after November 4 when the Presidency was no longer a goal but a fixed and fast-approaching date? We present a candid-camera account by a man who cov-

ered Mr. Eisenhower during those days of transition. The author, **Ladislas Farago**, editorial director of the Keystone Press Agency, held an important position during the war in the Office of Naval Intelligence and wrote, with Admiral Ellis M. Zacharias, *Behind Closed Doors*.

ALTHOUGH we can only look at straws in the wind for guidance in discussing the new Administration, we have an overwhelming mass of facts by which to assess the role played by President Eisenhower's predecessor. Mr. Truman, especially at moments when he had to make the gravest decisions, has always been conscious—but not self-conscious—that history would be his final judge. **Elmer Davis** shows that history is composed of many and changing histories. His estimate of the assets and liabilities that Truman will present for the accounting of history is friendly but in no way partisan. The man from Indiana looks at the man from Missouri. In both there is a strong streak of humanity and wisdom—more articulate in Mr. Davis because he is a professional writer—and both these representative Midwesterners show how false is our habit of identifying the Midwest with isolationism. For once we need not go into a writer's background: In our opinion there is nothing quite like the position Elmer Davis has made for himself in American journalism, and we are proud to have him write for us.

IT is frequently said that ugly and dreary as the Korean War continues to be, it at least has served the purpose of testing our latest military equipment and of training our soldiers. That is the kind of cliché and half-truth that *The Reporter* likes to take apart. In "Are We Teaching More Than We Learn?" a former regular Army officer who served in China during and after the last war shows that the testing and training work both ways. It is the people who have the most to learn who benefit the most from schooling. **James Colwell** (a pseudonym) gauges the extent to which the Korean War may be helping Communist China to build a modern army.

OUR European correspondent, **Theodore H. White**, has been visiting England after a year's absence. He finds the British people exhilarated by the prospect of the Coronation and thoroughly bored with politics. Perhaps this is because they see no real change since Mr. Churchill's return to power: The fact is that all British parties,

no matter what they call themselves, are Social Democratic Parties, and that such a pattern, once set, is not easily changed.

CONTINUING our analysis of the last election through the long morning after, **Harvey Wheeler** looks at the fateful process—from a Democratic viewpoint—by which the main groups that party has relied on for support are disintegrating. In his opinion, the Democrats are in danger of facing a long, long drought, and the party will need something more than A.D.A. vitamins (Philadelphia recipe) if it is to survive. Mr. Wheeler is a professor of political science at Johns Hopkins University.

AS OUR readers know, the "Views and Reviews" section of this magazine is the place where contributors express their more personal views. We are happy to give **Bill Mauldin** the same freedom to comment on things as he sees them that he enjoyed during the war in his cartoons for *Stars & Stripes*. He rose to fame as the spokesman for the G.I. to the civilian world; in a "Dear Joe" series of letters starting in this issue, he will now interpret a thoroughly bewildering civilian world to an old G.I. pal in Korea. Mauldin remains very much of an unconstructed G.I. himself, with all the G.I.'s gripes and, visibly enough, his strong prejudice against the brass. The section also contains our usual TV coverage, which, because it deals also with G.I.s, may get **Mary Mannes** into an argument with Bill Mauldin; **Hillel Bernstein**, author of *L'Affaire Jones*, reviews the history of reform in the United States.

WE ARE NOT in the crystal-ball business, but in our next issue we shall look at the possibility of what used to be frankly called a depression—a word now superstitiously replaced by such euphemisms as "recession" or "disinflation."

What are the various ways which the Republican Administration will take to avoid a danger that is real no matter what it is called? There will be a picture of the key men responsible for economic matters in the new Administration. This time the spokesman in the "Long Morning After" series will be a Republican Congressman, **Hugh Scott**, a former chairman of the Republican National Committee. We shall also look at the Congressional committees. What are they supposed to do? In practice, what is their actual accomplishment? Why is it that even the best among them can so easily go astray?

The State of the Larger Union

SOON the people of Great Britain will be cheering their Queen as she proceeds through the streets of London to her Coronation, just as the American people have cheered their President at his inauguration in Washington. The British ceremony is a celebration of historical continuity; ours, this time, marks a break with twenty years of the New Deal and the Fair Deal; the British parade the solemn ritual of their past; our drum majorettes herald a new set of leaders who promise a radical housecleaning in the immediate future.

For all our brashness there is a stirring quality about our pageantry. Yet it is difficult to avoid a curious feeling of unreality. Because, overshadowing all the celebration, there is a dreadful continuity weighing upon the new men and the nation. It is a continuity not foreseen by the Constitution and for which there are no precedents in previous changes in the party in power; it comes from the fact that our nation is engaged in a life-and-death conflict with a merciless enemy. No change in Administration can change that fact. All the measures anticipated by the new men, such as reductions in public expenditures, taxes, etc., are likely to prove no more than pious intentions because of the grip this enemy has on us.

This does not mean that the grip cannot be shaken; indeed it must be, but this requires a thorough stocktaking of our policies, foreign and domestic, if we are to make a fresh start.

In no field is the nation more indebted to Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman than in their conduct of foreign affairs. Franklin Roosevelt saved our country during the war. The Truman Administration built the system of alliances that has allowed the nation to face a new enemy and to counteract his aggression. Yet it is exactly our foreign policy that now must be the object of a thorough stocktaking. Adlai Stevenson would have had to tackle this job if he had won.

WE ARE NOW, and we have been for some years, in an emergency of unlimited duration. No four-year Marshall Plan or Point Four program can set

the world straight once and for all. Even the Atlantic alliance, far from freeing us from the need of constant interventions in the internal affairs of the allied countries, has made such interventions, so to speak, institutional. Single measures, such as assistance to Greece and Turkey, or, in the old days, Lend-Lease, frequently brilliant, always daring, have become too perilous, if for no other reason than that the peril is recurrent and always comes from the same source.

There is much to be learned from the way foreign affairs were conducted, first against Nazism, then against Communism—things that we must do again and better, and things that we must never repeat. About our wartime alliance with Russia, for instance: We must learn to distinguish between allied nations with which we are united in common principles and lasting goals, and co-belligerents, whose alignment on our side has been decided by the enemy rather than ourselves. The lesson that Stalin has taught us must not be lost now that we are dealing with Tito and Franco and Chiang Kai-shek.

The last war taught us another bitter lesson: We cannot assume the Godlike function of deciding that a country is not only a power but indeed a Great Power, and indeed one of the five Great Powers entitled to a permanent seat in the Security Council of the United Nations. In fact, China became a Great Power—under Mao—not because of any unity its people freely gained, but because they were made into a nation by the most ruthless of war lords.

In the same way it is supremely unwise—even if it is fashionable in United Nations circles—to endorse and take to our bosom any of the new nationalist movements in colonial or semi-independent countries without first considering what the so-called nations are likely to do with their independence. Our representatives in the United Nations and throughout the world must maintain a respectful but never mushy attitude—kind and tough—toward the nationalisms of all countries big or small.

We must be unblushing and unself-conscious in recognizing the fact that we interfere in the internal political and economic life of foreign countries. Our

interventions are of an entirely different nature from those of an imperial power, for what we do must ultimately be ratified by the people concerned.

The New Agora

There should be no question about the need for scrutinizing and codifying the precedents established by the Roosevelt and Truman Administrations in the realm of foreign as well as domestic affairs. But the question is how this scrutinizing, codifying job is to be done and by whom. At present the prospects are that trials by headlines—or television—will be used as the prevailing instruments of stocktaking.

The politicians know how to flatter the people by assuming that anyone within range of radio or TV is the supreme judge of past and future policies. The Greeks had this kind of direct democracy; it led to their ruin; it is the opposite of our representative democracy, where the sovereignty of the people is exerted by elected officials responsible to them. Strangely enough, it is particularly among Congressional leaders that the men who seek to by-pass the representative institutions of democracy are to be found.

Will the new Administration be strong enough to stem the tide of direct democracy and uphold the principles of our Constitution? Composed as it is of conservatives, will its conservatism be of the sort that inspired the writers of the *Federalist Papers*?

The Red Super-Patriots

Our new President has, we assume, no patience with demagogues. He also knows to what extent our security depends on our system of alliances—a system to which he has made imperishable contributions. He knows that our system of alliances implies certainly not the elimination but the curtailment of national sovereignties.

The Communists have become the greatest advocates of sovereignty and nationalism everywhere—in nations old and new. If, in Italy and France, the revival of nationalism might mean an anti-Communist crusade and eventually the outlawing of their party, the men in the Kremlin would not be sorry. If a nation is kept in a condition of quasi-civil war, if it is kept busy and harassed by its own inner strife with Communism, it will have less of a chance to participate in international anti-Communist coalitions. Whenever the petty nationalisms of the democratic parties loosen the ties of European unity, the men in the Kremlin have reason to rejoice. And, in general, the more democratic politics within a free nation is left to rot away in the damp and nar-

row crypt of sacred sovereignty, the greater becomes the Kremlin's strength.

Actually, the Achilles heel of democracy is the internal party politics of the free nations. All traditions and interests are represented by the existing parties except one: the longing for supranational unity. This longing, no matter how widespread, is too new to have become politically organized. Internationalism, or the need for supranational organization, is registered and expressed by a few leaders: Adenauer, Schuman, De Gasperi. We have learned recently that the revival of nationalism makes such men expendable.

In all the free countries the way of all political parties is to travel along the same road: party politics as usual, and nationalism. That road, if followed to the bitter end, leads to appeasement. We should not consider appeasement of Communism as something that must follow the old Munich pattern; we should not expect pictures of nationalist western leaders arm in arm with Stalin or Molotov. Appeasement of Communism is inevitable whenever a nation falls into the delusion that it can take care of its own troubles (including internal Communism), save its money, and avoid involvement in supranational ventures.

Our country is no exception, and the advocates of direct democracy, together with the all-out economizers and those men who want to get out of costly alliances, are driving along toward appeasement faster than they care to know. It is upon the men who head the Executive branch as well as on the few sane legislators whose voices still carry authority in Congress that we must rely. They alone—and particularly the President—can check the demagogues. If the President does this ruthlessly, it will be the sort of ruthlessness we shall welcome.

AT THE BEGINNING of the new Administration, despite the general impression, we do not share the opinion of those who expect an era of good feeling. The Administration, we think, has a tough time ahead of it, and from the very start, if it seeks to check demagogues, resist the growing nationalism of our allies, oppose the Kremlin—and at the same time tries to live up to its campaign pledge of economy to the bone. The pre-Convention fight between the Eisenhower and the Taft forces will go on, but now within the government itself—between the Executive and Congress.

All in all, we feel like people on a plane high in the air with a stormy, bumpy flight ahead. We tighten our seat belts, cling in our minds to the best we can think about the pilot, and trust God.

Businessmen in Government: The New Administration

A. A. BERLE, Jr.

IN THE TWENTY YEARS between the exit of President Hoover and the inauguration of President Eisenhower, American government has come full circle. The new Republican Administration is repeating with surprising fidelity the pattern of President Hoover—a government of big business, manned by big business. From this world, Eisenhower, like Hoover before him, has chosen first-ratters. All have outstanding records of honesty and achievement in business; all have records of integrity. But there are solid reasons for believing President Eisenhower's government will not be a repetition of Hoover's—save perhaps in slogans. Striking as are the similarities, there are deep and fundamental differences.

For big business, 1953, is not the same as big business, 1929. Its representative men have grown in a different stand of timber. In Hoover's time they represented property and ownership. Now they represent power and administration. Hoover was the owner of large enterprises; Andrew Mellon, his Treasury Secretary, was the dominant stockholder in the Aluminum Company of America, Gulf Oil Company, and a string of related enterprises. Eisenhower's team are not owners. They have brilliant records as salaried administrators. George M. Humphrey is head of the company which bears the ancient political name of Mark Hanna, President McKinley's old campaign manager; C. E. Wilson and Roger Kyes, respectively Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, are top-ranking officials in General Motors; Randolph Burgess and Robert Cutler are products of big banks; and so straight down the line. Like

most big businessmen of today, they are professional corporate officeholders. In the previous era, the businessmen turned Cabinet officers were successful risk-takers and developers. In the previous phase of American capitalism, a successful man became a billionaire. Now he manages a multi-billion-dollar corporation at a large salary.

Though the types have much in common, the generation now moving into government has greater assets and also, in some respects, greater liabilities. Assets and liabilities

alike differ from those of their predecessors of a generation ago. The comparison is a study in the evolution of American capitalism.

On the Credit Side

On the credit side must be counted the fact that the present group have been professional business politicians, though they do not say so. They have had to operate their businesses in the presence of public opinion—and in the framework of an unrecognized but very real government structure. The size of their companies made them so clearly a part of the American economic structure that they could not behave as though unemployment, the high cost of living, or even national foreign policy were not their concern. President Roosevelt made the point that America could not run half boom and half bust and that the Federal government must assure more or less satisfactory conditions. Businessmen hated him, but they caught his point.

In like degree, these men absorbed (though they did not announce) the fact that the government was an essential factor in their own business. They inveighed against "planned economy." But they planned the economies of their own industries wherever they could, and when necessary they invoked government intervention to help them do it.

THOUGH the fact is little realized even in business circles, twentieth-century American capitalism is increasingly a system of government-industry planning of national scope. Oil, for example, runs on a price-stabilization plan, the heart of which is the Interstate Oil Compact, signed




by all the great oil-producing states (except California) and periodically approved by Congress. Under it, the Bureau of Mines estimates the American consumption requirements; the great oil-producing states allocate production to fit the specifications; and the Federal "Connally Hot Oil Act" makes shipment of unallocated oil a criminal offense. Oil refineries enforce the plan by declining to buy crude oil produced in violation of the arrangement.

This scheme was worked out not by New Dealers but by the oil industry itself. Steel has been operating under a similar though less well worked-out plan compelled by the steel shortage in 1946-1947. It took form under the Voluntary Allocation Act passed (interestingly enough, at the instance of Senator Taft) in that year. That Act expired, but the scheme was perpetuated in the present Defense Production Act. Dozens of other schemes, from aluminum to sugar, operate under special legislation or under the present Defense Production Act. Evolving these plans has meant constant contact between big businessmen and the government, with frequent appeals by both sides to public opinion.

Finally, as of now, the overpowering stabilizing factor (if it is stabilizing) is the fact that government is the chief customer of big business in practically all fields from alkali to zinc, from electronic equipment to ships and socks. This stabilization, born first of war and now of rearmament, has caused a massive intermixture of political and business action. Under it, the thirteen years since 1940 have been a period of the greatest recorded development of the American economy. Business and the public alike depend on its continuance. So far as economics goes, the country is as well satisfied with its lot as Americans ever are.

But to do this, the American businessman has had to be in Washington, at Chamber of Commerce meetings, or on the air. His public-relations staff has been steadily taking a hand in discussions of political theory; appeal from a failure of governmental co-operation (as the businessman saw it) was taken to the public just as politicians appeal



an adverse decision of Congress to the grass roots. The successful administrator of a large corporation has been, willy-nilly, a type of politician. This is a good introduction to government life.

SUCH was not the custom of the older generation. The great capitalist-owners of the day of Andrew Mellon or the elder Morgan kept away from the public. The late George F. Baker rejoiced in the fact that in fifty years he had made only two speeches, each of them not more than a couple of sentences long. Contrast this with Benjamin Fairless or Clarence Randall, campaigning in season and out for the position of the steel companies during the steel crisis, or with General Motors, maintaining for years a weekly broadcast over a national network to explain

its political philosophy and ideas and to exhort Americans to support the leadership offered by American business.

On the credit side also must be counted the scientific education which American businessmen have thoroughly accepted. There is still complaint by the plant men against the "long-haired know-how boys" in the laboratory and research departments. But the mathematicians, the physicists, the esoteric research men are no longer discarded as "impractical." The General Electric laboratory is one of the great scientific institutions of the world. The abstract scientist now is subsidized in universities by research grants made in volume by the hardest-boiled boards of corporate directors. Socony-Vacuum Oil Company, in endowing a fellowship in petroleum exploration

science at Harvard, announced that "the petroleum industry was founded on the vision and knowledge of educated people."

The business philosophy is that production will solve everything, and that science and trained men make unlimited production possible. Honor then to the scientific scholar. Properly used, he is a noble part of capitalist civilization.

Many indeed of the great businessmen now emerging in government were technically trained themselves, either formally in universities or less formally through training programs of the companies in which they worked. Engineers, geologists, chemists, lawyers, and (occasionally) renegade university professors—these are the businessmen of today. National City Bank vice-president Randolph Burgess, who will manage the national debt for President Eisenhower, has a Ph.D. in education. These men are a far cry from the shrewd operators, the students of the stock market who carried the banner in Hoover's day. The wider outlook of the new men will stand them in good stead in government.

On the Debit Side

Against these very large credits must be set some substantial debits.

One of the great business virtues may become a vice in certain gov-



Wilson

ernmental fields. Businessmen, being rational themselves, believe that with good contacts, astute handling, and tactful discussion, any difference can be bridged. One sector of American business in 1940 sincerely believed that if we had "handled" Hitler carefully we could have "settled up" the issues leading to the Second World War. Even now a substantial group believes we could do business with Stalin—if only we went about it the right way. So it proves in business; why not in foreign affairs?

THE lack, of course, is an understanding of intellectual and especially of philosophical forces. Now philosophy is an abstruse subject in universities, but it generates currents that can set millions of armed men marching and tear the world apart. Free men could no more settle accounts with Hitler and his Nazi philosophers and can no more make effective arrangements with the Kremlin Communists than an atheist could negotiate a viable compromise with the Pope. In its way, the businessman's feeling does him credit: Men ought to be rational. But in certain ranges, where interests are unlimited, men's actions rest on their value judgments. Men will insist on dying for their country and their religion because these involve their lives and their personalities. They will consider it ridiculous to die for Pittsburgh Consolidation Coal Company and the therapeutic use of higher interest rates.

They are right on both counts: Business is not a religion exacting loyalty but a practical means of getting the world's work done. Here lack of background can be perilous. Should diplomacy exact another conference with the Kremlin, there is danger that it will be approached

as though we were settling a law-suit, whereas in fact it would be a milestone in a major philosophical and religious conflict.

PRESIDENT Franklin Roosevelt once complained that big business was not bad but was often humanly illiterate. There is no evidence indicating a change in that respect. The big businessmen, though they have been in politics, commonly have not done the political work themselves. They have relied on public-relations staffs to write the speeches, publish the house organs, set up the press releases and radio programs, and lay out the propaganda lines. (Let us exclude the less creditable reaches where dwell the influence buyers, the five per centers, the Washington lobbyists, and the political law firms.) These men naturally think primarily not of the public but of how best to further general and specific measures and policies serving the financial interests of their companies. Public-relations men are commonly more royalist than the king, but, like all professional propagandists, they convince their clients more than any other group.

Their outpourings make it clear that big business has not thought through and does not talk the language of the new American capitalism but repeats slogans of a generation ago. The theme song is "individual initiative"—but big business from sulphur to aluminum is more often than not urging or working under a national plan that circumscribes areas of freedom and works on the conception of guided co-operation. The foe is "government in business"—though this "government" is the largest customer, sometimes the principal supplier of capital, and always the ultimate stabilizer. Factually, big business is now public enterprise, accountable to the community that supports and relies on it. But the social theories it expounds are at complete variance with actual business practice and conditions.

Whose Free Enterprise?

From this arise many of the political difficulties of business. As practical men, corporation executives have sought security of markets



Brownell



and prices and insurance against risk for their concerns. But when labor and individuals, who were in far more dangerous positions, have sought insurance against unemployment and old age, business has talked the language of *laissez faire* and unsuccessfully fought Social Security. When health insurance was proposed, business fought it—this time successfully. If an individual was benefited by a public measure, sturdy Americanism was being undermined

and "creeping socialism" threatened the Republic. But it was merely good business to advocate fair-trade laws to allow price fixing, to attack the enforcement of the antitrust laws that forbade agreements restraining free markets, and to plug for high tariffs preventing foreign competition. Corporation theorists have not yet absorbed the idea that "free enterprise" for General Motors means one thing and free enterprise for Joe Doakes means quite another.

The fact is that the American economy is now substantially an administered economy, founded on a system of basic industries, each dominated by a concentration of three or four industrial giants, generally operating under nation-wide planning. This writer does not share the horror manifested by some when this state of affairs is revealed. It seems to be very successful and to offer a sound base for tremendous future advance. But the advance must be translated into the terms of individual benefit and self-fulfillment and individual protection. The dogma has generally put business in the position of fighting against measures for individual benefit while demanding measures for corporate benefit as necessary economic arrangements.

AN ILLUSTRATION may be found in the announced policy of the incoming Administration for handling government finance. The plan is to allow interest rates to "rise to natural levels." The theory is that when the government borrows from banks, it creates bank deposits which are inflationary, while if it borrows savings from the public at long term, the inflationary effect is avoided. The theory is probably sound; it is upheld by most economists. But as a result, a merchant will pay more at the bank for his borrowing and the home buyer will pay more interest on his mortgage. Long-term government bonds will be issued at rates of interest higher than the standard rate of recent years. In plain arithmetic, the millions who have bought government bonds, either as investment or for patriotic motives, will see their bonds go down in value because of the less attractive yield.

Sympathy need not be wasted on

large investors. They are in and out all the time. The banks, the big insurance companies, and financial institutions will make more money than they have for years. But for those who bought bonds at government urging on payroll plans, talk about natural economic forces working toward balance and thus avoiding inflation will not help much. They were not exhorted to buy to vindicate economic laws but because the country needed money.

A purely political Administration, convinced that interest rates had to rise, would make a concession to this feeling. It would offer to exchange the old bonds for the new bonds paying a higher rate of interest with no loss. This is politics. A "business government" is more likely to leave a small investor to the tender mercies of the open market.

Mortgages and Taxes

But that is only the beginning. For the government, allowing the interest rate to go up means running up the long-term interest rate everywhere. The greatest individual impact will be on the borrowers for homes—especially small ones. There, the young man amasses a modest down payment and finances the rest on a twenty-year mortgage or thereabouts, and he pays the interest on that debt for half of his adult life. To him the effect is to raise the actual price on his house—and on his car, and on his icebox. The ramifications of a rising interest rate are



Hobby



almost unlimited. Banks, the money-lending agencies, and others are prosperous during these periods, and to them all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds.

Again, the business theory is that taxation of corporate and individual incomes is now so high that it reduces incentive to work hard and make money. Accordingly, the proposal is to reduce these taxes and get in the revenue by a Federal sales tax. For practical purposes, this means raising the prices of most of the goods ordinary people have to buy. A majority of the public will wonder whether this "protection from inflation" is not more expensive to them than the original disease.

THE POINT, of course, is simple. To the businessman, business is an agency for production and distribution. The less it is used as a tax-collecting agency, the greater the freedom of action of the directors. They are sure they can handle the money more wisely in the general interest than the government can. Free enterprise to them means free enterprise for corporation managers. Obviously the freedom of choice for the individual is reduced; a sales tax means that he can buy less and so is more restricted.

This illiteracy runs through the whole line of corporate propaganda. Individuals, it is said, think too much of "security"—Americans ought to like taking risks, reaping rewards for courage, initiative, and so forth. But the corporation never runs an avoidable risk. It will stabilize prices, will adjust production to consumption wherever possible, will invoke the

help of the government in time of trouble. The corporate executive who complains when his labor wants a guaranteed annual wage and retirement pension will demand for himself the most elaborate contract and pension rights.

Idealism vs. "Common Sense"

And businessmen have one great lesson to learn. In the world of ideas, dreams, and hopes, and in the philosophy that binds motives together and makes a democratic government tick, they are often so many children. In politics, masses of men are swayed by ideas they consider greater than themselves. The American public knows that it reaches for ideals perhaps not attainable in this world: peace, freedom from fear, reasonable probability that the children will surpass their fathers, a human society free from hatred. Democratic government means precisely canalizing these hopes and dreams and thoughts toward practical action. The U.S. government has been doing this since the days when Washington and Madison assaulted the nationalism of the thirteen colonies, when Jefferson insisted that education should be nation-wide, when Andrew Jackson insisted that no part of the country, however new, should be excluded from a share in the country's growth, when Lincoln challenged the vested interest of slavery.

Businessmen, on the other hand (it is to their credit), properly limit their thinking. In any situation they try to find the common-sense step to take, going no farther than is necessary, waiting for the logic of events

to indicate the next move. Instinctively and, in their world, probably rightly, they distrust dreamers.

BUT, of course, business does not need to call on the higher spiritual qualities. This is fair enough. House organs and advertising campaigns that identify the best interests of the company with attainment of the Kingdom of Heaven are likely to be laughed at.

But now, governing the United States, businessmen must ask people to act against their best interests, against the dictates of intelligent selfishness. Intelligent selfishness cannot not dictate sacrificing your life or your son's life if there is any way out of it. A government must ask that men stand ready in some measure to lose themselves in a greater loyalty, for a benefit and a glory that will never be reflected in a profit-and-loss statement.

The brilliant group of bankers, steelmasters, industrialists, and financial lawyers now taking over the government will have to learn a lesson if they are to succeed. The twentieth-century revolution in American capitalism transformed private business to public enterprise. Its aggregate product was not an end in itself; its true end was to furnish means of defense and means of life for hundreds of millions. Philosophers, teachers, dreamers, poets, scholars, artists, actors, editors, journalists struggle to give to that life the means of grace and the hope of glory; without them, it would fall apart. Business could idealize itself as a huge but humble part of this endless search; it has not yet learned to do this.

The corporate executive now directing armies, navies, and air squadrons, exacting sacrifice and toil, prescribing limits for the strong, asked to ameliorate the lot of the weak, must call on the idealism of millions far more than he stresses the practical advantage to individuals. Otherwise the legions do not march, the millions are skeptical, the allies wonder, and the keystone of the free world no longer supports its arch. Learning this is a mighty lesson, often a bitter one. From its splendor and bitterness will be distilled the next phase of American life.

Snapshots Of a President-Elect

LADISLAS FARAGO

I HAD SEEN Dwight D. Eisenhower only three times in my life before the election, when I was assigned to cover him for a period of sixty days. Since then I have seen him many times and in many places—on the roped-off third floor of the Commodore on Election Night; at the National Golf Club in Augusta, Georgia; in front of Washington churches; on the roped-off sixth floor of the Commodore, where he had his office; at the United Nations headquarters; and on the sidewalks of Morningside Drive.

I would like to make it plain here that seeing did not necessarily imply conversing with the man I saw. Seeing the General in my particular case meant observing him in his various habitats, looking at him from close quarters, watching him with a purpose while he himself was probably both oblivious and impervious even to my presence.

I didn't use telescopic lenses or

periscopes to observe Eisenhower. I merely attached myself to a large group of newspapermen and office seekers during their prolonged vigil on the various doorsteps of the President-elect. A couple of times I even managed to penetrate into inner sanctums by using harmless but effective disguises in the honorable but almost defunct tradition of investigative journalism. I am mentioning this merely to show that one had to resort to such romantic tricks to get near the man, so perfect was his isolation from the press.

I had been prepared for my closer contact with Eisenhower only by legend and gossip. He had been represented as a competent, easygoing, jovial, innately diplomatic individual; somewhat flexible in his convictions, vague in his views, and lax in his intellectual pursuits; addicted to Western novels and bridge; a superb mixer, a quick thinker, and a pleasant boss.


I discovered that legend and gossip had dealt somewhat too kindly with some of the Eisenhower traits and a bit too harshly with others.

THE Eisenhower I have seen in my marathon observation is a more striking but less endearing personality than the version promoted by the skilled transfer of his grin to the front page. He is a better-looking man than his pictures show him to be, and certainly younger looking than his image on the television screen. While the flamboyant ruddiness of his mobile face, which is the dominant aspect of his appearance, is frankly due to frequent exposure to sun lamps, this is the only artificial contribution to otherwise genuine good looks.

The Eisenhower I saw was somewhat shorter than my imaginary picture of the man. He appeared small-boned and thin-skinned, but wholesome and handsome. His grin



Photographs from Wide World



comes readily enough to his whole mouth rather than to his lips, and it rarely remains a grin. It broadens quickly into the merriment of a man who is not particularly discriminating in picking things to laugh about. In fact, what many consider Ike's spectacular sense of humor seemed to me at times somewhat deficient in both sense and humor.

Eisenhower dresses very well, with an obviously expensive but ingratiatingly nonchalant elegance. He shows no inclination toward the buoyant haberdashery of his predecessor. On the contrary, he prefers plain colored shirts and quiet ties, around which he builds the harmony of his dress. In my opinion, Eisenhower is one of the two really well-dressed men in America, the other being C. D. Jackson, a towering figure, at least physically, in the Eisenhower entourage.

At first contact, the new President is quick in his movements, lively in his gestures, grand in his approaches, and generally easy in his manners. It is evident that he is consciously engaged in keeping himself in trim and that his masseur is excellent. On the whole, in outward appearance the United States has gained a strikingly handsome President, whose sartorial preferences will add new luster to an office somewhat neglected in this respect since Chester Alan Arthur.

Wide Range of Expression

The Eisenhower face is a study in itself. Its lively expressiveness comes on three planes: on the plane of his

eyes, the plane of his nostrils and lips, and on the plane of his chin. It is the truly masterly co-ordination of action on these three planes that results in the familiar flexibility of that famous face. How much of it is conditioned reflex and how much is deliberate I do not presume to say.

The range of these facial expressions is enormous—a fact of which the public is probably unaware, if only because Eisenhower has rarely been shown in pictures without his friendly grin. But I have seen him laughing so broadly that his merriment struck me as well-nigh uncontrolled and so angry that his fury impressed me as almost frightening. Then there was still another look, both contemptuous and sardonic. I thought that this third look disclosed an overwhelmingly important facet of a personality that is far more complex than is generally assumed.

The two really revealing features of this interesting Eisenhower face are the eyes and chin. The eyes have the deceptive qualities of a mountain lake. They are attractive, unruffled, and inviting, but icy. Those little mountain lakes (which several European languages call "the eyes of the sea") depend on the sun for their shining beauty and become forbiddingly dark whenever a curtain of clouds is drawn before the sun. It is the same with Eisenhower's eyes. Whenever the sunshine leaves them, they become dark and forbidding.

You have to watch Eisenhower for quite a while to recognize the true

qualities of his chin. Like his eyes, it acts up only when he is in a brooding or angry mood. In the first case it becomes wrinkled, pensive. In the second it protrudes, revealing a purposeful determination that you never even suspected in the man. His chin and his eyes are both disconcerting because they reflect ruthlessness.

I was first confronted with the total Eisenhower face on Election Night, on his private floor in the Commodore. Only a select few had entry there, but it was still quite a beehive; even a select few amount to quite a number during a landslide.

The Eisenhower on the third floor of the Commodore on Election Night was a rather boisterous man dominating a rather boisterous scene. But then I recalled that Willkie was not a reassuring sight either on Election Night in 1940. The only difference—and I feel it was a significant difference—was that Willkie was losing and Eisenhower was winning. Eisenhower's exuberance was in contrast to the quiet and dignified charm of Mamie Eisenhower, who seemed as tearfully contemplative as her husband was boisterously jolly.

Eisenhower came to the third floor from Morningside Drive in a handsome new dinner jacket with a jaunty cummerbund. It was very early; only scattered returns were in, and not even the most rabid Citizen for Eisenhower could discern a trend. Yet it seemed that nothing in the world could keep the General

on Morningside Drive, if only because he for one had no doubt whatever of the outcome.

I watched him moving up and down, slapping people on their backs, shaking hands eagerly and generally exuding confidence. What impressed me most on that crucial night was a lack of humility in the man who was keeping his rendezvous with destiny. I was not alone in this opinion, but others who felt the same way as I did attributed the man's cheer to biochemical processes usually induced by highballs. Today this may sound both irrelevant and irreverent, but that night in the Commodore it was his loudness and cocksureness that made the greatest impression on me. Here was a man to whom the election and the counting of the votes were merely tedious formalities, delaying what he believed to be a foregone conclusion.

Eisenhower went before a multitude of his campaign workers in the grand ballroom of the hotel at an early hour, when only a few in that crowded hall seemed absolutely certain of victory. His little off-the-cuff speech reflected, I thought, an irrational confidence. Back on his private floor, the jubilant candidate greeted friends as if he were acknowledging their congratulations rather than their hopeful best wishes.

As time dragged on even at that frighteningly rapid pace of mechanized history, the General became generally impatient with the delay and personally impatient with his

opponent's tardiness in admitting defeat. "Why doesn't that fellow concede?" he was heard to ask. When "that fellow" did concede, Eisenhower displayed little grace.

He returned to the ballroom with an "I-told-you-so" look in his eyes and with his rather commonplace telegram to Governor Stevenson. I watched the response of that chosen crowd. It was not an overwhelming response, and it is to the credit of the people present that they remained but moderately elated even in this long-sought moment of triumph—perhaps because their enthusiasm was tempered by the cocksureness of their leader.

After the Battle

The following morning, the President-designate left New York for Augusta, Georgia. According to the official announcement, he went there to rest. But anyone who had a chance to watch him at the National Golf Club must have realized how much of the General's imperishable vigor remained. In Augusta Eisenhower became the busiest President-designate in history, surpassing even Franklin Roosevelt in the eager enthusiasm with which he grappled, if not with policies, at least with the selection of the men who would have to make or execute policies.

During those busy days, the private plane of Eisenhower's friend and chief adviser, Lucius D. Clay, was the busiest conveyance in America. It ferried a wide assortment of

callers to the National Golf Club—but only men Eisenhower wanted to see. There were no gate crashers. At one point, two Congressmen from Pittsburgh arrived, confidently expecting a warm welcome. They never got beyond the rather formal confines of the Bon Air Hotel. They never saw anyone higher than one of Eisenhower's secretaries. I suspected that this brush-off symbolized not merely a new aloofness in the General but also the shape of his Congressional relations to come. As I watched the faces of the two Congressmen a few minutes before their departure, they seemed to reflect not only bafflement but also reconciliation to unfamiliar new facts of life.

While the momentous conversations were held in the golf club, the press was kept not just at arms' length but more than a mile away in the Bon Air. Only twice were the barriers let down: once to allow correspondents to see the General playing golf, once to allow them to participate in his wife's birthday party. Otherwise the reporters had to subsist on the rather dry K rations of infrequent press releases, the contents of which ranged from the announcement that Dewey would not be included in the new Administration to Eisenhower's expression of his sorrow at the death of President Weizmann of Israel.

IN THE meantime, however, I was lucky enough to glimpse the Eisenhower-behind-the-curtain. I flew to





Augusta in the special plane in which Eastern Air Lines ferried Governor Thomas E. Dewey from Charlotte to Augusta. In the same plane was Walter Williams, president of the Citizens for Eisenhower-Nixon Committee. Dewey was in a communicative and cheerful mood. He spoke readily, volunteering all kinds of information, and then chatted volubly with the correspondents who rushed to greet him at Bush Field to relieve the monotony of their assignment.

Four and a half hours later I saw Dewey emerge from his long talk with the General. On the next day I saw Williams both before and after. In both cases I was impressed by the changes in mood of these two practical political experts. After their talks with the President-designate, both looked subdued and quiet, like schoolchildren after a severe lecture from the principal. Dewey became as taciturn as he had been communicative. Williams was still talkative, but his conversation had lost some of its assurance.

I subsequently saw Senator Lodge, General David Sarnoff, and Walter Reuther going in to Eisenhower's office in one mood and coming out in another. Only Mrs. Oveta Culp Hobby, the former WAC director and the new Federal Security Administrator in the Eisenhower régime, entered Eisenhower's office and emerged

from it displaying the same starry-eyed exaltation, like a little girl determined to see a vision and convinced that she had.

I think the changed moods of those shrewd men were caused by two somewhat unrelated experiences with the General. First, they were probably subdued by Eisenhower's rather overwhelming conversation. The experience of being summoned into the presence and then not being able to get in a word edgewise must have been a rather disappointing one, especially to men who approached the coveted appointments with a number of their own ideas that they were anxious to express to the General.

Their other experience was more important. These people were being made to understand that their new chief was not a mere figurehead, a captive, a mouthpiece. Closeted with the President-designate, they had to realize that he was the boss.

To men who probably fancied themselves as kingmakers, this realization must have come as a sobering experience. It was particularly evident in Dewey's case and even more so in the cases of General MacArthur and Senator Taft after their meetings with the President-elect. Dewey's post-Eisenhower behavior left no doubt in my mind that the leadership of the Republican Party had passed into the hands of a real leader, while both MacArthur and Taft showed clearly that they knew Eisenhower would never be satisfied with a place on their knees.

Mental Heel-Clicking

That Eisenhower will be the boss in his own house was the most reassuring impression I came away with, although at first, I admit, it was a little discomforting. The Eisenhower entourage, from ex-Governor Sherman Adams down to the pretty receptionist in the Commodore, is a devoted, intelligent, and efficient collection of men and women who serve their leader. Service is the key word in the new Administration. There may be other key words: discipline, efficiency, careful planning, impeccable staff work, discretion, loyalty, some ability—and again, discipline and efficiency.

I have seen a lot of mental heel-

clicking around Eisenhower. His subordinates address him as "General" and refer to him as "the General" in subservient tones. To people who ever served on the staff of a senior officer in the Army or Navy, this will sound familiar. They will recall that the quality of their staff work was the sole criterion of their usefulness and that their primary function was to protect their bosses from embarrassments and mistakes. This atmosphere of self-abnegation, preparedness, and unqualified service results in permanent tension—but it also leads to tight organization.

Eisenhower's entourage is a political replica of the military organization, because no matter how civilian or civil his political philosophy may be, he brings to the execution of that philosophy the military tradition, practice, and experience of his lifetime career, a career which was instrumental, indeed, in paving his way to the Presidency.

If on the basis of such an unorthodox and purely visual survey I am nevertheless permitted to offer a sweeping prognostication, I would say that under Dwight David Eisenhower the people of the United States will enjoy the blessings of an orderly government. In what direction his government will go or how inspiring and progressive it will be I do not dare predict.



Harry S. Truman

And the Verdict of History

ELMER DAVIS

As Harry S. Truman goes out of office on January 20, the editorial pages of the eighty per cent of American newspapers that opposed him will probably be filled with anticipations of the Golden Age about to dawn. But they will doubtless devote some attention also to the protagonist who is leaving the stage. Most of them will probably say they are glad he is going, in language ranging from decorous gratification to obscene howls of joy. Some may attempt to estimate his achievement, or the lack of it; but the judicious may well leave such assessment as he himself hopes it will be left—to the verdict of history.

What history? Whose? And when? If Hitler had won the late war, Dr. Goebbels would have supervised the writing of the histories, and nobody would ever have known what happened. If Stalin should win another one (which I do not expect), Ilya Ehrenburg or somebody of the sort would be entrusted with rearranging the sequence and motivation of events in a manner of which the late trials in Prague have given us an example.

But in the countries where thought is still free it usually, and properly, manifests that freedom in disagreement. After two thousand years, historians are by no means unanimous as to the merits of Julius Caesar; was he plus or minus, net? (I think plus, if anybody cares.) At the moment there is pretty general agreement that Caesar Augustus was distinctly plus; but a hundred or two hundred years ago most people regarded him as a tyrant who had abolished liberty—failing to realize that the only liberties he had even constricted were those of the Roman



Truman

equivalent of the once-famous American Liberty League.

In our own history, the verdict of the jury seems unanimous on Washington and Lincoln—for the moment. Yet within the last few years a book was published which endeavored to show that Washington was never interested in public affairs except when his own pocketbook was affected; and I have no doubt that somewhere there lurk unpublished manuscripts which maintain that Lincoln was just another snollygoster. With even a minor turn in public opinion, they might get into print.

Historians Working; Don't Disturb
Which is to say that history is written by members of the human race, who have their share of the emotional predilections of all humanity

—modified, it may be hoped, by their training in evaluating evidence, but seldom entirely expunged. Our Federalists, when they could no longer make history, got their revenge by turning to the writing of history, and they dominated American historiography through most of the nineteenth century; the Jacksonians were too busy making history to notice them, and by the time people did notice them, the climate of dominant opinion was again Federalistically inclined. We have the greatest difficulty in finding out what happened in Rome in the third century A.D. because the surviving histories were written in the fourth century by hangers-on of a Senate which by that time was no more than a disregarded Fronde; the Emperors, facing an increasingly impossible job, were too busy making history to worry about their reputations in future centuries.

Eduard Meyer wrote the history of Athens and Sparta in terms of Prussia and Austria, with Themistocles as a Bismarck *manqué*; as a work of art it is magnificent, but one cannot help wondering what really happened. The great Dr. Toynbee has predicted that three thousand years from now, what will mainly interest historians in our age is its religious sentiments. If that is so they won't have much to write about; but nobody can now prove that Toynbee is wrong.

And underlying all these variations in historiography due to personal inclinations or to the intellectual and emotional climate of an age is the one great constant that will be with us so long as thought is free: the necessity that confronts each successive generation of histori-



Washington

ans of making its reputation by proving that its predecessors were wrong. That impelling need has been responsible for many advances in human knowledge, also for a considerable number of wanderings on wrong tracks.

SO THE VERDICT of history on Harry Truman in 1953 is about as likely to be right—provided it is an attempt at history and not a partisan editorial—as the verdict of 1983, or of 2353, for that matter. It is true that in the course of decades more documentation will come to light, but unless it is documentation from the Kremlin it will be of minor importance. It is possible that Stalin does not keep notes and memoranda—the imprudence of the Nazis in setting down all their skullduggery on paper should have been a warning; and it is doubtful if any other member of the Politburo could trust his secretary, his valet, or even his wife enough to keep them. Anyway, if notes are kept, they are unlikely to survive the eventual collapse of the Kremlin organization, whether from external or internal causes. (And if, contrary to expectation, we and not they collapse, none of this will matter.)

As for yet-unpublished material in American government archives, it is hard to imagine what there is left to say. In the MacArthur hearings a year ago last spring, the Secretary of State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and

everybody else of importance (except the President) in the executive branch of the government lay down on the couch of the Senatorial psychoanalysts and said everything that came to mind in free association. If any detail of American diplomatic and military thinking, or the reasons therefor, was omitted, it was only because no Senator thought to ask about it. Our recent history could be summarized in that sentence with which the Victorian novelist used to commence his final chapter—"Little remains to be told."

The Two Trumans'

The reasonably objective attempts to estimate Harry Truman, as of 1953, are so similar that they express themselves in paradoxes that have become clichés. There are two Trumans—the White House Truman and the courthouse Truman. He does the big things right, and the little things wrong. He has a high conception of the dignity and prestige of the Presidential office, yet he lowers it by his occasional outbursts at news conferences and by those famous letters.

I would not question the general validity of these estimates. Still, the estimates seem to me to require modification and adjustment.

Take the last item first—the letters. I am told on good authority that he wrote them (by hand) before breakfast, when no man is at his most judicious, and slipped them into the mailbox himself before anybody had a chance to say, "Wait—are you sure you really want to say?"

Yet some of those letters, which nobody has rushed into print, are of a very different sort—letters such as perhaps no President since Lincoln would have thought of writing. Add them all up and you have a man who, in becoming President, did not cease to be a member of the human race; if you cut him he bled, and if you cut him too deep he was likely to slash back, whether it was wise to do so or not. But he retained more amiable human sentiments too.

One of Mr. Truman's chief advisers has told me that perhaps his greatest accomplishment has been that he "institutionalized" the Presidency. He could not institutionalize responsibility; but he could do, and he has done, a great deal to see that

the President has thorough information and competent advice before he exercises that responsibility. It is to some extent true that many of these institutions merely take the place of Harry Hopkins, who did most of their work for Roosevelt; but you are not going to get a Hopkins very often, and it only makes sense to try to provide that any President shall have the best possible substitutes.

Not all of these institutions work as well as they should. The National Security Resources Board should be important, and apparently was intended to be; but it had hardly got started before it was overlaid by the Office of Defense Mobilization, and it has hardly been able to get its breath ever since.

The Council of Economic Advisers was an excellent idea, but any President is likely to pick advisers with whose economics he agrees beforehand. If not, the advisers may give up and quit, as did Dr. Edwin Nourse.

Potentially the most important of all is the National Security Council. In emergencies it can work fast, as it did in the Korean crisis, but normally the flow of policy decisions through its channels is viscous indeed. Most of its members are heads of departments; usually being busy running their departments, they have to delegate their duties on the Council; often the delegates subdelegate, and so on. So General Eisen-



Polk

hower was (or seemed to have been during the campaign) converted to a proposal that had several times been advanced by private citizens—that the National Security Council should be enlarged by the appointment of two or three more members who would have nothing to do but sit and think about the most basically important national problems. But the results of their thinking, when translated into policy, would have to be carried out by the operating heads of departments; and suppose these men do not agree with the policies evolved by the thinkers? Anyone who has ever worked in government knows how much foot-dragging there can be before an overworked President has time to notice it.

A similar reform has been proposed for the Joint Chiefs of Staff by Dr. Vannevar Bush, who knows as much as anybody about the way our government actually works. At present three of the four Joint Chiefs are the operating heads of the armed services, with a chairman who has great prestige but no vote and—at least as spelled out by statute—no power. Actually the present chairman, General Omar N. Bradley, seems to have been principally useful by informally performing the functions of a no longer existent post, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, which was held by his wartime predecessor Admiral William D. Leahy. Dr. Bush truly observes that the heads of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force have full-time jobs running their services; let them be replaced on the Joint Chiefs by senior officers about to retire who can sit and think. But suppose the results of their thinking do not commend themselves to the operating chiefs who would have to carry them out; suppose the things the operating chiefs feel they must do serve to create a policy that has not been digested and approved by the thinkers?

This is the old hiatus between policy and operations that has probably been a problem of government ever since the days of Cheops and of Lugalzaggisi. Unless our descendants are wiser than we are, it may still be a problem of government when Dr. Toynbee's fifteenth-century scholars are turning to the



lighter task of recording and analyzing the religious sentiments of our times. All that can be said is that Mr. Truman has created a good deal of machinery which ought to make it easier for any President to reach sound and well-informed decisions. His successor may thank him for it, unless Sherman Adams should turn out to be another Hopkins.

White House and Courthouse

Now for the Great Antithesis—the White House Truman and the courthouse Truman—the Kansas City politician who worked his way up in an unsavory machine, remaining personally untarnished but acquiring an acute reluctance to admit that his associates could do anything wrong; and who, after some years of service in the Senate, suddenly found himself the Chief of State and chief of government of the most powerful nation in the free world, not long before it became evident that the modus vivendi between the free and the non-free worlds was breaking down. And who, as he faced these stupefying responsibilities, brought into his immediate entourage some of his associates of his courthouse days; who in turn, whatever their faults or virtues, retained the limitations of the courthouse.

Nobody could have predicted seven years ago that the White House Truman would succeed in pulling the world together when it was in grave danger of coming apart, while the courthouse Truman would be unsuccessful, even by courthouse standards. He did indeed get himself

re-elected, and he did so by a very able display of the higher type of politics. With that faith in the people which is one of his most profound and genuine emotions, he took his argument to the people; he had a good story to tell—the record of the Eightieth Congress—and he told it effectively.

But four years later the formula no longer worked. Maybe it could not have worked, against the glamour of a great military hero who promised everything, and under the increasing burden of a party too long in power. But that burden had become heavier in four years than the mere lapse of time would justify; the Democratic Administration had grown tired and lax—in some spots shabby, and in some spots worse than that.

THREE WILL always be some corruption in government, and there has been much less than was alleged in the past four years. But there was too much, more than usual; and it was concentrated in the departments which above all others should be free from it, the money agencies and the administration of justice. There would have been less if Harry Truman had not had in unusual degree the normal human reluctance to believe ill of his friends, or even of their friends.

When Senator Fulbright found evidence of grave misdoing in the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, he took it to the White House to give the President a chance to clean it up. The President refused to believe that a clean-up was needed, and when the Fulbright Report was published he called it asinine. Eventually he had to clean it up; he put in Stuart Symington, who handled the situation promptly and effectively, took away a reproach, and got no thanks for it. For when Symington went after the Democratic nomination for Senator from Missouri, Truman supported his opponent—an old friend and associate whom he may have felt he had to support, but he might at least have said something kind about Symington's public services. Symington was nominated and elected, and the net result was a serious blow to the President's prestige in his home state. Not good,

even by courthouse standards. Nor did the President remove those men around him whose behavior, though not criminal, had made them obvious political liabilities. (Congress, of course, did nothing about its members who were touched by the various scandals; but nobody ever expected Congress to do anything.)

All or Nothing

All in all, in domestic affairs Mr. Truman has been an unsuccessful President. The first great setback, the Congressional election of 1946, could not perhaps have been avoided in a nation then hell-bent for "normalcy." That calamity Mr. Truman succeeded in retrieving two years later (with considerable help from the Congress elected in 1946); and he presented to the new Congress a liberal program which was coherent and logical as the New Deal had never been. Congress, not being liberal, refused to take it; yet every year he persisted in offering it all to them again, and they still wouldn't take it. Lincoln, in such a situation, would have astutely judged how much of his program he could get with smart management and would have played off one group against another so as to get some of it at least. Truman kept asking for all of it and getting none of it.

His enemies, of course, maintained and perhaps believed that he wanted to keep it in dispute, as a winning platform for the next election. I doubt that, but I am not privy to his motives. Whatever the motive may have been, his behavior didn't look to me like smart politics. If it seems so to any generation of future historians, they will be judging by standards incommensurable with ours.

BUT as time went on, domestic issues were increasingly overshadowed by foreign affairs; and there the White House Truman shone ever more brightly.

We had seen that Truman earlier, on a different issue. When in 1946 the Republicans regained control of both houses of Congress, it was generally taken as a forecast of what would happen in the next Presidential election. After a year and a half of Truman the nation had had

enough of him; let him resign, as would a British Prime Minister after a similar vote of want of confidence, and turn the Administration over to the Republicans. So argued, among others, Senator Fulbright (which may explain why Truman was disinclined to listen to him later, when Fulbright happened to be right).

For a mere politician this would have offered an opportunity to throw the Opposition into utter confusion. As the law then stood, the Secretary of State was next in the line of Presidential succession, there being no Vice-President; all the President had to do was persuade Secretary Byrnes to resign, which he did a few weeks later anyway, and offer to appoint in his

and content himself with signing its decrees, with no more power than a President of the French Republic theoretically enjoys, and considerably less influence than President Auriol has actually been able to exercise.

Mr. Truman knows American history; he knows how the Constitution was made and why; and he chose to stick by the Constitution rather than amend it by his own action under the pressure of the Republicans' civic ardor. (Such a resignation might easily have set a precedent; the Canadian Constitution says nothing about the Prime Minister's being dependent on a majority of the House of Commons, but he is.) Our form of government might have been completely changed, and without going through the deliberate process which the Constitution prescribes for such changes, except for the fact that Harry Truman could not be pushed around.

First-Rate and Third-Best

Mr. Truman's loyalty to his friends has been responsible for much of his trouble, but it has its good side. He not only stood by Donald Dawson and Merl Young and Harry Vaughan; he stood by Dean Acheson, against such a storm of abuse as no Secretary of State since Seward has had to face. (Seward, so copiously damned in his time, is by the current verdict of history the second-best Secretary of State we ever had; my guess is that Acheson will be recorded as third-best, by at least some generations of future historians.) Mr. Truman, replacing Stettinius in the State Department, made a bad choice to start with in Jimmy Byrnes; but he followed him with Marshall, and Marshall with Acheson, and it is hard to see how he could have done better. Except, of course, in the opinion of those who hold that anything he did was wrong. That view, widely advocated last fall, may be modified now that the election is over and the Crusaders, so often disappointed, have at last surmounted the walls of Jerusalem.

The modus vivendi with Russia which Mr. Roosevelt hoped he had established—though that hope had begun to fade just before his death—fell apart during the first year



Acheson

place any man whom the Republicans might choose as the successor to the Presidency. Party machinery offers no method of making such a selection, except the quadrennial national convention; there would have been a dogfight among half a dozen competitors, which might well have ended with the President announcing that he must reluctantly retain the office, since the Opposition was not harmonious enough to select a man to take his place.

But he said he would not resign; nor did he accept the innocent though no doubt well-meant suggestion of the *Washington Post* that he appoint a Republican Cabinet

of Mr. Truman's Presidency; but what that implied did not become apparent till the end of February, 1947, when the British suddenly declared that they couldn't carry Greece and Turkey any longer, and somebody else would have to pick them up if they were to be carried at all. This was such a decision as the United States had never had to face in peacetime, and Harry Truman stood up to it.

I do not know who was responsible for his generalizing that decision into its logical conclusion—that "it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures"; but it was the logical conclusion, even though we were then by no means prepared to live up to such a spacious commitment.

We did live up to the immediate commitment to Greece and Turkey—ultimately with complete success, though we owed that in large measure to a break of luck, the excommunication of Tito. Later it was argued that this principle required us to give all-out aid to Chiang Kai-shek; the argument had logic behind it, but it conveniently ignored the fact that China is fifty times as big as Greece.

After the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan. During the late campaign the Republicans sometimes pointed out that after all it was adopted by the Eightieth Congress; so it was, and the credit belongs in about equal measure to Arthur Vandenberg and to Joe Stalin, who seized Czechoslovakia at just the right moment to make most of even the most myopic Congressmen realize that something had better be done.

Also, however, it was denounced in the late campaign as a giveaway program, as buying friends; but this seemed halfhearted. It had too obviously pulled western Europe out of a ditch into which it was rapidly slipping; all they could say against it was that it proved not to be enough and had to be supplemented by NATO; and not much could be said against NATO, in view of General Eisenhower's immense contribution to its success. Attacks on foreign



policy had to be mostly centered on Asia, where, visibly, we had not been successful. We had lost China—or sold China, depending on the conscience of the man who was doing the talking; and few people ever bothered to ask how China had come to be ours to lose or to keep.

For that matter, few members of Congress who damned our Far Eastern policy ever said whether or not they would have voted for the extensive recommendations of the Wedemeyer Report if it had not been withheld from publication for two years out of consideration for Chiang Kai-shek's feelings; still less whether they would have voted for whatever else might have been necessary to "save China" if the Wedemeyer recommendations had not been enough.

Stopping the March

However, China had not been saved, by us or by the Chinese; meanwhile there was "Truman's war" in Korea to talk about. . . . It is hard to remember back, now, to June 25, 1950. Here the familiar parade was starting again—Ethiopia, the Rhineland, Austria, the Sudetenland, Czechoslovakia. Then, it could have been stopped in time; did anybody remember that in 1950? Some men did; including the man who had to make the decision.

While I do not know, I doubt

that on that June night either Mr. Truman, Acheson, Louis Johnson, General Bradley, or even the infallible Douglas MacArthur knew how much of a war we were getting into. The original idea of mere sea and air support to Republic of Korea troops looks not so much like adherence to a strategic doctrine which Taft and Hoover adopted after its fallacy had been proved (as it had not been then) as like a conviction that this demonstration of American power would be enough to cow the lesser breeds without the law.

Unfortunately it was not enough. And if they had realized that they were getting into a war which would absorb a third of American ground and air power and would still be undecided after two and a half years—a war whose inconclusiveness would win an election for the Republicans—would they have gone in anyway?

I think they would. For they all knew what it would have meant if Communist conquest of another nation had gone unresisted. Every nation on the borders of the Communist world would have wondered, "Are we next?"—and they would have had no hope that anybody would help them.

Also they all knew—even MacArthur—what it would have meant to have Communism on the Straits of Tsushima, ten minutes by jet plane from a Japan which would have felt that it stood not only defenseless but alone. Even Eisenhower, in the late campaign, said that the decision to fight in Korea was right, though he felt it necessary to bow in the House of Representatives by talking about the disastrous policy blunders that made the Korean War possible.

The greatest moment in Eisenhower's life, it would seem, was when he made the command decision to go ahead with the once-postponed Normandy landings in the justified hope that the more optimistic weather reports were right. The greatest moment in Truman's life—greater even than the moment of decision to support Greece and Turkey—was the moment when he decided: If we don't stop this thing now, we may never be able to stop it.

This, it seems safe to say, will be the verdict of history—some history,

at some time in the future; but the next generation of Ph.D.s will overturn it, with conclusions which themselves will in due course be proved erroneous.

Jackson? Polk?

One estimate made by some of Mr. Truman's admirers can be discounted now. Among his predecessors the one he seems most to admire is Andrew Jackson; and it has been said that if he is not a Jackson, he is at least a Polk. Well—he could ask little better, for James K. Polk was one of the most dazzlingly successful Presidents we ever had, though the vagaries of historiography have kept most people from realizing it. He got the principal measures of his domestic program enacted into law; he fought and won a war, and honorably avoided another war that he might not have won; and he extended our frontier to the Pacific, adding several hundred thousand square miles to the territory of the United States. Truman can record no such successes as that.

Polk had Truman's firmness; he also had a lot of luck. Once or twice, when the percentage favored a finesse, he banged down his ace and caught the lone king. He was at the head of a still fairly well united party; it began to go to pieces in his day, but it lasted long enough for him to get his domestic measures through. He won the Mexican War pretty much by main strength and awkwardness. (Truman would have been utterly incapable of an idea Polk once considered, of appointing a Democratic Senator with next to no military experience as commander of the Army simply because the generals who were winning battles belonged to the Opposition party.)

Polk showed at his best, perhaps, in the negotiations with England over Oregon. He bluffed hard, convinced that the English were bluffing too; eventually they quit raising him and then he compromised on the present boundary, which previous Administrations had been willing to accept. Such a settlement today would be denounced as appeasement and was denounced then as its equivalent in the idiom of the

time. But we were just getting into another war, and even most of the war hawks had sense enough to realize that we couldn't manage two at once.

But the England of 1846 was no such antagonist as the Russia of 1950—if for no other reason than because there were still major powers on the continent of Europe; and English involvement in a large-scale war in North America would have weakened England's influence in European affairs gravely. Also England was a power which by definition and ideology could compromise; as no Communist power can, except as a matter of temporary tactics.

A Century Later

Truman confronted the only other strong power in the world at a time when not only the American people but every other people in the world that had anything to say about what was going to happen was war-weary; most of them were willing to do almost anything to



Fulbright

avoid another conflict. At the end of seven years, somebody had "lost" China—maybe we did it, maybe the people who had China to lose. But nobody had lost Greece, or Turkey, or France, or Italy; and it is extremely probable that they would have been lost but for Mr. Truman's interventions. Nobody had lost the part of Korea that was free when he came in; and nobody had lost

Japan, which would pretty surely have gone if the Communists had conquered Korea.


John Foster Joshua

He was telling the simple truth when he told the Alumni Association of the Industrial College for the Armed Forces, in December, that thanks to the policies of his Administration hundreds of millions of people are living in freedom instead of in slavery. The Republican platform, however, denounced this as "the cowardly and futile policy of containment," and one understands that all this is now to be changed. The man who damned containment as cowardly and futile is to become Secretary of State; he has promised us a new policy which will be affirmative, dynamic, and at the same time absolutely safe; and it won't cost us a nickel.

All we need is a sense of mission and purpose; then moral and spiritual forces will penetrate into the minds and souls of those under the ruthless control of the Soviet Communist structure, and the edifice of despotism will surely crumble. Just a few toots on the trumpet, and the walls of the Kremlin will come tumbling down.

Amen; let us all hope Mr. Dulles is right, for if he is we shall all share in the benefits. A world in which there was no tyranny and no danger of war would be a far happier as well as a far less expensive world; I shall be out there leading the cheering when the stonework of the edifice of despotism crumbles to dust, leaving the free peoples of the world to build them more stately mansions in its place.

But somebody had to lay the foundations on which those more stately mansions will be erected, even if he gets no credit for the architecture of the completed structure. In my judgment, it will be the verdict of a good many generations of future historians that the man who laid the foundations was Harry S. Truman; even though each of those generations will be succeeded by another whose duty it will be to earn its reputation by proving that its immediate predecessors were all wrong.



The Great McCarran Act

Korea: Are We Teaching More Than We Learn?

JAMES COLWELL

ONE frequently hears it said that, whatever the cost may be, we are undeniably gaining valuable military experience from the Korean War. Although this can hardly be urged as a reason for continuing our part in the conflict, it is held out as a sort of consolation prize.

The purpose of this article is to suggest that Korea will in all likelihood produce another result that will not only nullify but very possibly much more than offset the value of any such experience. Our struggle with the Chinese Communists will very shortly require a reappraisal of China's position as a world power, not so much because of what the Reds have accomplished in Korea as because of the necessary corollaries to their accomplishment.

Franklin D. Roosevelt presented Chiang Kai-shek and his Government with a membership in the Big Five that was largely honorary, and in fact even the Chinese Nationalists made jokes about it. Mao Tse-tung, on the other hand, is likely soon to present very tangible qualifications for Big Five membership—a well-trained, battle-wise army, able to slug it out on equal terms with the forces of the foremost western power. For this new prestige he will have two powers to thank, Russia and the United States.

It is not the intent of this article to explore the diplomatic, moral, or political aspects of our intervention in Korea, but rather to attempt to answer one intensely important

question: What is China's future as a military power?

Our Red-Star Pupils

There can be little doubt of the relative state of military proficiency of the Chinese Communists and of our forces at the start of the present conflict. Both had combat experience, it is true; the Chinese, in fact, over a much longer period. But the value of experience lies not only in its duration but also in its character. Chinese strategy was the "human sea," surely a "strategy" born of desperation. China is rich in humanity, but has never been rich in trained manpower or military equipment. Military history abounds in human seas, from Marathon on through Gettysburg and Tannen-

berg. Most often they have been used by the desperate or incapable.

Prior to 1950 the Chinese Communists had not fought in campaigns which in the strategic organizational sense belonged in the twentieth century—or even the nineteenth. In weapons and in small-unit tactics they were more advanced, but they were still decades behind the times. The only present parallels are to be found in the often fierce but seldom decisive campaigns of partisans and other guerrillas.

The Red Chinese forces had a lot to learn. Our own military knowledge is being increased by Korea, but we are not the only pupils in the schoolroom. What is more, as we learn we teach. We must ask



ourselves if we are not teaching more than we are learning.

In fighting both the Nationalists and the Japanese, the forces of Mao waged essentially an "irregular," guerrilla war. Only after V.J. Day did the Communists undertake operations against major Japanese forces. Even these, however, were only for the purpose of forcing the surrender to the Communists of arms that otherwise would have gone to the Central Government. There was no need for strategic planning, no fear of anything but the most limited defensive measures on the part of the enemy.

Before Korea, these represented the most extensive military operations ever conducted by the Chinese Reds against the forces of a first-class power. While the Second World War went on, the Communists contented themselves almost entirely with hit-and-run raids on Japanese-held rail lines and strong-points. Most of these attacks were made at night by small bodies. The Communists' tactics were those of the French *maquis*, the Yugoslav chetniks and partisans, and of T. E. Lawrence's Arab irregulars.

It was never a war of artillery preparations, of electronics, of bridge and road building. There were no attacks requiring co-ordination of the tanks, the mortars, the howitzers, and the guns; no air strikes; no ack-ack; no reppo deppos. Ammunition was captured, sometimes purchased, from the enemy. Strategy was merely the formulation of policies to be followed in different areas. As there was no planning of large operations, there was no development of a staff trained to plan or execute such operations.

The situation did change with the defeat of the Japanese. The Communist Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, which had been very loosely knit bodies spread over thousands of square miles, began to assume more orthodox form. The Nationalists made the colossal blunder of trying to occupy and hold the country the same way the Japanese had. Very quickly there developed a conflict involving much larger bodies than the Communists had ever employed before. Nor was the Nationalist organization greatly different



from that of the Communists. The war was primarily between large masses of infantry with very little support from other arms. Most of the Communists' victories were achieved because of their ability to concentrate without opposition around isolated Nationalist forces. The only continuous operations were the sieges of large towns. Often the Nationalists' capitulations were caused more by hunger and disaffection than by military action.

Thus in 1950 the Chinese Communists were virtually without experience in modern war, with the exception of certain specialized types of operation. Of the all-important fields of staff organization, planning, and command of units the size of a division, it is not possible that they had more than the most superficial knowledge.

It is hardly necessary to point to the contrast in our own forces. In 1945 we were victors in the first truly global war. Our staffs had planned and our troops had successfully executed campaigns in the deserts of North Africa, in the jungles of Burma and the Philippines, and in the fields of France and Germany.

In the ensuing civil-war battles Mao's men were pitted against adversaries often armed with pikes and

cutlasses; we had faced 88-mm. guns and Tiger tanks. The Reds besieged and carried towns ringed by stone, mud, and brick; we had broken the steel and concrete of the Atlantic Wall and the Siegfried Line. Where Chinese attacks might at the most have been supported by the fire of independent batteries of artillery, we had developed new concepts enabling us to turn the fire of perhaps a hundred batteries on one critical area.

Unprogressive Education

Without doubt we are learning in Korea, but the course is being conducted on a theory that is out of favor with present-day educators. The bright boys are forced to go through the same things as those just beginning to read. It's almost like a tennis star who is forced to play day after day with a duffer; in the long run only the duffer will profit.

This doesn't mean that it's an easy war. That's the tragic part; for the man in the line there isn't any such thing. The men in the ranks, American and Chinese, are learning the same things: to kill and yet to survive. In the long run, from the cold military standpoint it doesn't make much difference whether the Chinese or the Americans learn the more. Their younger brothers or their sons will bear the brunt of the next struggle.

But in the arena of power politics it makes a great deal of difference if China emerges from Korea with military leaders and staffs capable of blueprinting and fighting a first-class war. It was Jackson, Lee, and Grant who made our Civil War a classic in military history; it was not the gunners, engineers, and riflemen whom they had led fifteen years earlier in Mexico.

Anyway, it is questionable how much we would really benefit from Korean War tactics and techniques even if we went to war elsewhere relatively soon. We are deceiving ourselves if we think that we shall long have available a pool of Korea-trained combat veterans. At the most a draftee is required to put in six years on active service and in the reserve. Actually the greater part of the returning veterans quite under-

standably drop into a completely inactive status. It is not hard to imagine the outcry if they were the first to be recalled in a new crisis.

There is another important limitation on the amount of experience our Army gains from Korea. A relatively small portion of our available military manpower is being drafted. Even a smaller portion ever sees combat. Rotation is a long time coming. Six months should be the maximum for any doughboy to learn about combat. Long before that he may have passed the point of diminishing returns in his learning.

Here again we must assume that the Reds have the edge on us. There is every reason why they should send hundreds of thousands through the mill, training the maximum number possible against a future conflict.

WARS usually give great impetus to the development of weapons and matériel, and the Korean War has been no exception. The ruthless selectivity of combat eliminates not only the mentally and physically unfit but also the mechanically unfit. Again we must ask ourselves who has profited the most from Korea.

We have gained in many ways, most notably in improved aircraft and tanks. Our recoilless 57-mm. and 75-mm. guns, which can be carried by foot soldiers, have been battle-tested for the first time. We have a new and more effective bazooka and an improved 4.2-inch mortar. Rifles and carbines have been modified and increased in deadliness. In all these respects the American fighting man of 1953 is better equipped than he was in 1945.

Communist China does not yet possess the facilities to develop weapons on the scale that we can, but we know that the Russians have done at least as well as we in the past. The Mig-15 and the T-34 tank furnish irrefutable proof of their abilities. So from a qualitative standpoint it would be dangerous to believe that we have made more than isolated technical advances over our adversaries.

Reports of our losses from anti-aircraft fire indicate enemy superiority in fire-control radar, which is borne out by the testimony of electronics experts who have examined

the equipment we have been fortunate enough to capture. This, of course, is Russian matériel; the war has not only hastened the rearmament of China, but has served as a proving ground for its senior partner.

But there is another and equally vital aspect of arming a nation's combat forces: standardization. The Red Chinese forces entered the present conflict with a veritable hodgepodge of weapons—Chinese, American, Japanese, Russian, and even German. With their mass attacks it is apparent that a large portion of the weapons with which the Chinese were originally armed must have been destroyed, captured, or left to rust on the field of battle. And although most of the replacement weapons have probably come from Russia, it is only reasonable to suppose that the Chinese have been forced to expand and adapt their own arms industry accordingly. Prior to the Japanese invasion, the arsenals of Mukden were turning out excellent copies of European matériel. There is no reason why a revived Chinese arms industry should not now be using Russian patterns.

In times of peace China has not been a unified whole for at least a hundred years. Its foreign occupiers were intent primarily on exploiting their own spheres of influence for their own home industries. More recently, in the past forty years, the bulk of the nation has been divided among independent warlords whose self-interest did not favor a strong national economy. In times of war China's enemies were so quick to seize the industrially productive

areas, small as they were, that any incentive for national unity could express itself only in futile resistance without the material necessities for effective struggle. Now, for the first time in its modern history, China has been able to fight a war on the territory of another nation.

It is hard to imagine a war that could be better conceived for the build-up of China's military potential. In no other type of military undertaking could the country so well utilize its few strengths while not exposing its many weaknesses. The Korean Peninsula has acted as the tiny spout for a vast funnel through which Mao can pour his masses so that quantity can compensate for quality. China had never before been able to do this in modern times.

Invisible Weapon: Esprit

In another sense, too, the Korean War represents a significant break from recent Chinese history. Except in the Second World War, where it was saved by powerful allies, China has always been the loser in its struggles with first-class powers. But now, even if all our terms were to be accepted, China would stand as the conqueror of North Korea.

It is difficult to say how important this factor might be from a military standpoint, but it should go far to inculcate esprit in the notably spiritless though brave Chinese soldier. We very well may find that we have not only trained our Chinese adversaries in skills they would never have acquired otherwise and indirectly given them technically competent leadership, but also given them an aggressive spirit that will send them in search of new fields. It has happened before. The armies of Napoleon were the direct successors of those which had been raised to defend the feeble new French Republic from its hostile neighbors.

In the main we can only speculate as to what the future may hold for the military forces of the Chinese Communists. Tibet and Indo-China do not furnish encouraging precedents. It is not hard to imagine determined Chinese forays into Malaya and Burma. We can only trust that we shall not encounter Chinese "volunteers" any farther from their own country.



Britain In Coronation Year



THEODORE H. WHITE

BRITAIN is going to have a party. By now, the holiday mood has spilled out of the great iron-grilled gates of Buckingham Palace, washed over London, and flooded the farthest reaches of the island. In its tide, it has washed out of public conversation the grim and tedious problems of politics, trade, socialism, and defense which have perplexed the British since the war.

The party will not take place, of course, until June, when the young monarch will be crowned Elizabeth the Second, By the Grace of God, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of her other Realms and Territories Queen, Head of the Commonwealth, Defender of the Faith. But the fuss, the gossip, and the simmering little disputes over the celebration are a welcome change from the dreary diet of public affairs. . . . Shall the Peers of the Realm be allowed to come to the Abbey in their ancient carriages? Will the Crown supply their steeds, as is their immemorial right, when already the Crown is hard pressed to find proper horses for the major participants in the procession and must hire movie-studio coaches for the tail of the

parade? Is the Earl Marshal right in permitting Peers in the Abbey to wear trousers under their mantles instead of the courtly knee breeches?

'One Hell of a Boozer'

At a time when British politics has reached the numb flatlands of apathy, every editor of a major newspaper or magazine has discovered in the Coronation a rich vein of public interest, an insatiable appetite for pomp and ceremony. Mr. Churchill's Government makes sure that this appetite is sedulously and continuously satisfied. The declarations and announcements follow one another in cascade, each couched in the archaic language that calls up memories of ancient splendor.

"Of course steel denationalization is important," said an industrial correspondent to me in smoking Birmingham, capital of Britain's heavy industry, "but you don't think anyone's talking about it, do you? Why, I wouldn't put two lines about that

rubbish in my story if I were writing about England. It's the Queen they're talking about. Talk to those people about denationalization and they say, 'What's that got to do with me?' But talk to them about the Coronation—the Coronation is holiday, it's the day of rejoicing, with bonfires on the hills and one hell of a boozer to boot."

Stale Bread, Pale Circuses

There are, to be sure, some cold-eyed individuals who are not swept away, who insist that the Coronation is all politics, something Mr. Churchill pulled out of his pocket to brace his traditionalist politics. Aneurin Bevan's weekly insists that the Coronation has saved Mr. Churchill's Government from its problems as effectively as the abdication of Edward VIII saved Stanley Baldwin's. But most people frown at this sour note. "Why, it isn't politics at all," one of the palace aides said. "People love the Queen. It's my belief these Socialist chaps would have spent far more money on the celebration if they were in than the Tories are planning to do."

Everyone agrees that the unexpected growth in popularity of the



Churchill Government over the past six months owes something to the warming radiance of the coming Coronation. Yet to ascribe this good fortune to the happy accident of an ancient rite would be as unfair to the Conservatives as it would be comforting to Labour theoreticians. For the Tories, during fifteen months in office, have proved far



shrewder than anyone expected—and their shrewdness has been dramatized by contrast with the confused and quarreling leadership of the Labour Opposition.

EVEN the far Left of Labour's many-headed leadership agrees that the Churchill Government is now substantially stronger in the country than its thin Parliamentary majority would indicate. "We told them," said a leftist Labour M.P., "that there'd be mass unemployment and war if Churchill was elected, and there hasn't been either. They're living well and they've still got jobs. It may be a fool's paradise they're living in, but you can't go around the country talking about terms of

trade, Treasury reserves, and the dollar shortage. They've heard about one crisis after another for seven years, but they've never seen the crisis with their own eyes." Churchill, continued the M.P., was lucky in the very narrowness of his majority, just as he felt Eisenhower and the Republicans would find their narrow control of Congress lucky too. Caught between his die-hard right wing, which wanted to abolish all Labour's achievements overnight, and the Tory left wing, whose members would not tolerate turning the clock back, Churchill has been able to get support from both sides for the moderate course he has followed. Thus to appease the Right he pressed such bills as steel and road-transport denationalization. But he would not and could not tamper with the one great heritage Labour had left the country—the welfare state and the intellectual climate of socialist morality.

This, the leftist Labour M.P. insisted, was the great problem of Britain and the great failure of Labour—Labour had created an entirely new social climate in Britain without a social revolution. The country could not support all its social services and all that ordinary people had come to expect of life without a cruel and sweeping social and industrial revolution; when another crisis came and Labour was recalled, it would have to offer Britain a ten-year program tougher than anything that had gone before, for Britain had to learn to pay its own way without dependence on the dollar. "All the Tories can do," the M.P. concluded, "is to fiddle with the fringes, keep things quiet for a while, and hope for American dollars to pull them out of the next hole we get into. Fifteen billion dollars, I guess, should take them through the next two crises, or maybe three."

This is the way the Opposition reads Mr. Churchill. But the administrators, the austere and aloof civil servants burrowed in the thousand offices of Whitehall just up the way from Parliament, give the Churchill Government a different kind of reading. They regard it with the same lofty superiority they regarded Labour—and the Tories are just as annoyed by their own inability to

bend the civil service to their will as were the Labour Ministers.

The civil servants, like the Parliamentarians, are fascinated by the Churchill-Eisenhower comparison. They all seem to believe that in a modern government, policy is set by forces beyond the control of politicians. Politicians come in full of fresh ideas and the baggage of election campaigns—and then the facts are explained to them.

Bureaucratic Facts of Life

Churchill named Richard Austen Butler as Chancellor of the Exchequer on the Saturday after elections. On Monday Butler lunched with two senior Treasury officials, who presented him with two twenty-page documents on the trade crisis drafted by the civil service during the campaign; they told him what had to be done. Soon Butler lunched with Churchill and explained the position to him and the Cabinet. The next Wednesday Butler imposed the import cuts the civil service said had to be imposed—and which, say Whitehall's thinkers, Labour would have imposed in precisely the same fashion if Labour had been returned to office. Neither an Eisenhower nor a Churchill, say the British civil servants, can alter fundamentally any social reforms that have become part of a nation's life. Social democracy is now the way of English life, and England has three parties whose names hide the fact



that one is the Conservative Social Democratic Party, the second the Labour Social Democratic Party, and the third the Liberal Social Democratic Party. According to British civil servants, the Republicans in Washington will find, just as the Tories have in London, that no election campaign can dismantle years of history.

Plus Ça Change . . .


The visitor who returns to England after a year's absence is fascinated not so much by what the Tories have done as by how little change they have brought to the life and government of Britain. Anthony Eden's foreign policy in the Middle East, the Far East, Europe, and the Commonwealth is indistinguishable from Herbert Morrison's policy. Mr. Churchill's slowdown on the British defense program is even more pleasing to Labour's backbenchers than was Mr. Attlee's direction of defense. The vast National Health Service which Labour created goes on without change because Butler, who holds the purse strings, is passionately devoted to the social services. The intricate structure of control and direction of industry that the Conservatives promised to sweep away persists in all its infinite ramifications; capital investment is still controlled and directed by the same committee of Treasury specialists.

Every British housewife still carries in her purse the same brown ration book that controls her butter, cheese, margarine, meat, sugar, and candy. Coal is still rationed. The state still does most of Britain's major shopping abroad, buying its wheat, meat, butter, sundry foods, cotton, and critical nonferrous metals. Allocation by license and end-use control still channel the flow of materials through industry in accordance with the state's wishes.

The urge to remold Britain out of its semi-socialist profile still throbs in the thousand Conservative clubs scattered over the country. But it can show itself only on the margins of administration, not in the substance of policy. Thus the Tories choose to attack inflation by tightening credit controls while Labour chose to fight inflation by tightening taxes.

Where the Tories try to apportion Britain's global resources differently from Labour, they find they can advance one project only at the expense of another. Thus, under the Tories twenty per cent more houses were built in Britain last year than in 1951—but there was a corresponding drop in the amount of factories built.

The Tories have tried to undo the apparatus of socialism—but it has taken over a year for them to get their first major attacks on purely socialist measures before Parliament.



This winter, the Tories have succeeded in bringing to the floor of the House their bills to denationalize the steel industry and road transport. But even Tory members admit to a queasy uncertainty about the Government's ability to unscramble these enterprises, and a deeper uncertainty over private capital's willingness or capacity to take them back.

AS FAR as food is concerned, Mr. Churchill has derationed tea and announced the forthcoming end of egg rationing. Labour would probably have done the same. But Mr. Churchill watches over each press pronouncement of the Ministry of Food like a hawk—almost as closely as he does over the communiqués on foreign affairs. Each new easing of a regulation is cleared first with the Prime Minister's office and carefully timed for maximum political effect, because each new announcement creates a wave of conversation that lasts

for weeks or months. When the end of egg rationing was announced, the newspapers bubbled with comment for days.

Any economist equipped with charts and price indexes will show that the reduction of food subsidies has sent food prices up by eight per cent since the Tories took office late in 1951. Any housewife will report the same thing: "It's two bob a week more for everyone in the family." The Ministry of Food will likewise admit that thousands of British families are no longer buying even the meat ration of one shilling eight-pence (twenty-three cents' worth) weekly per person. So will the butcher, who no longer winces when someone says out loud, "Have you got anything extra this week?" He usually has and is glad to sell the ration someone else hasn't claimed. But in a country where rationing by the book has gone on for thirteen long years, rationing by the purse seems momentarily like recovered freedom. Even the housewife who says it takes fifteen shillings more a week to feed the family hastens to add, "But there's more in the shops now."

IN THE red-brick corridors of Lancashire, an organizer of the spinners' union tried to describe it all for me in terms of mirage. People in Lancashire thought ten years ago that anybody who earned five pounds a week had a fat pay packet. Now, the organizer went on, most of his people earn about seven or eight pounds a week. They still vote Labour. But those who have graduated to between ten and fifteen pounds a week sometimes vote Tory. They do so because they feel cheated—they want to buy what ten and fifteen pounds a week would have bought before the war, and they can't. The Tory pitch, according to my informant, is that with a Conservative Government they will once again be able to buy ten pounds' worth for ten pounds and damn the paper controls. "They don't notice what's happening," the organizer concluded; "it's a ha'penny more on the bus fare, tuppence more there, half a crown more somewhere else. They don't think about it now, but when Easter comes round and the three of four quid they should have saved



up isn't there, then they'll know it, and they'll come back to us."

The little things of life stir more people than the great articles of political faith even in those cities and towns where men and women are most concerned about politics. Take nationalization, for example. The management of the great socialized enterprises is of interest chiefly to the administrative technicians worrying over the details. Only once in a while, as in road transport, does one sense an interest on the part of the workers in what is being said in Commons; but even in road transport the interest is limited to those few thousand long-haul truckmen whose routine of life was changed by nationalization and who murmur of a strike if denationalization brings back the previous routine. Most local van and truckmen do not care who owns the trucks so long as they work and the wages are good, and their union leaders are against a strike.

IN THE industrial Midlands, the leader of the iron-and-steel union in one of Britain's biggest steel towns said to me: "I don't give a damn who owns the thing. There's a hell of a lot of fuss in London, but there's not up here in the trade. I deal with the same people under nationalization as I dealt with before, and as far as labor relations are concerned the position hasn't changed in any way, shape, or form. Frankly, the union would rather the industry stays nationalized because it's easier to get a nation-wide policy that way, but we won't strike if they denationalize it. All we want is for them to stop making steel a shuttlecock of politics in London."

The sounds of Parliament are odd indeed when one comes back to Lon-

don from the unruffled calm of the Englishman in his home, village, and pub. For the House of Commons has tangled itself into a snarl of ambuscade and trickery, resulting in a frustration that has exhausted and embittered ordinary Members. Snap votes keep harassed backbenchers, who are sometimes kept on call until three and four in the morning, pacing the corridors as they wait for the tinkling bell that summons them, like schoolboys, to trot down to the division lobbies to be counted for votes. A young Tory backbencher told me that he was so fed up with the guerrilla warfare of Parliament that he thought he would not stand again at the next election. "We're here as ballot fodder," he said. "We've nothing to say, we're here just to be counted. Parliament doesn't think any more—it's presented with a seventy-page bill reorganizing the entire trucking industry and it gets just five days to talk about it."

There is no easy explanation for the sudden transformation of the robust British House of Commons into an imitation of the wrangling, sniping French Assembly. Some say it is because Parliament is talking to itself—the country is simply not much interested in what it says. Others say it is all Labour's fault—that Labour is so deeply divided in its own house, the Bevanites against the party leadership, that the only unity it can achieve is on Parliamentary tactics against the Tories. But more important than either of these reasons, perhaps, is the feeling of the M.P.s themselves that the issues they debate at home are of secondary importance, for Britain's true problems are to be settled only in the great outer world.

This feeling is sharpest within the ranks of the Opposition. Labour is united on a vast array of issues—on defense of nationalization, on defense of the welfare state, and on the need for working out a complete new theoretical doctrine of socialism, one that will be clear enough to bring response from the people and practical enough to meet Britain's needs. What divides the leaders of the Labour Party is their attitude to the outer world. Labour's right wing—the whole crew of ex-Ministers—

is stuck with the present form of the American alliance, because it was fashioned during its terms in office and accepted by it as the only workable foreign policy. Labour's left wing, led by Aneurin Bevan, insists that the American alliance has to be taken apart, completely reconsidered, recast, and put together in totally different form. The Bevan doctrine, of course, would require a degree of austerity and domestic "toughness" which no Bevanite has yet outlined in public. But the appeal of the doctrine recruits constant new strength, even on Labour's front bench. What is more important, it is beginning to draw a ripple of popular interest in the country beyond London.

The Old Master

Against this confusion in Labour's ranks, the leadership of the Tories, blurred as its objectives may be, seems powerful and cohesive. Leadership among the Tories still means Churchill. The party's majority in the House is slim, but its confidence is enormous. The Conservatives will very probably retain the leadership of Britain for the next four years—Churchill does not plan to call for new elections until the end of his term—unless death finally conquers the indestructible Prime Minister.

Of Mr. Churchill there is much



gossip these days. He is old; and when he walks, half-crouching, all of his seventy-eight years seem to weigh him down. He is hard of hearing but dislikes wearing his hearing aid. In the midst of debate he will sometimes turn to whoever is sitting behind him to say, "What's that? What did he say?" as if asking for someone to point out the target for his riposte. He is forgetful, occasionally confusing facts and figures on the floor and rambling erratically in the privacy of the Cabinet. He seems shy and hesitant with strangers now, leaning heavily on the old cronies with whom he is comfortable. Yet when all this is said, Mr. Churchill remains the firmest fixed point in all of Britain's amorphous politics. On his great days in Commons—they are rare nowadays—none can match his wit, scorn, and fire.

Defending himself against Labour's motion of censure, standing bent over before the bench, he still seemed the biggest man in the House—polishing each shaft before launching it true to the mark, enjoying

himself and drawing laughter even from Labour's benches—though not when summoning the Labourites to "shake and shiver in their shoes with shame."

MR. CHURCHILL, say those who watch British politics closely, has no grand strategy for the global dilemma. Yet, over a year, a lesser substitute design has emerged. It is the persistent Churchillian design, born of the war, of linking the destinies of Britain and America. The design must deal with the dull stuff of trade and finances, which always bored Churchill, but its simple perspective is to support the great Anglo-American military alliance with a permanent economic relationship.

Whether or not Churchill understands the detailed trade figures, he imposes his strategy on them. Britain cannot live over a trap door of bankruptcy, plunging from crisis to crisis in every odd year—1947, 1949, 1951, and perhaps again in 1953. This imposes on the grand old man

a huge agenda to be dispatched without a hitch in the shortest possible time. First, Britain's own house has to be put in order, a task which, according to current trade figures, has been achieved for the moment, even though at the cost of expansion and defense. Next, Britain must consolidate its leadership of the entire Commonwealth in a newer and closer economic unity—for which purpose the Commonwealth Conference was called. After that, the nations of Europe must be brought to associate themselves with British leadership.

But at the beginning as well as at the end of this huge program there is America, which must know what is being planned and why the urgency is so great. To bring this knowledge to his old friend Eisenhower, Churchill decided that the Western Hemisphere and not North Africa was the best place for his two-week winter rest. Then he will tackle his job from 10 Downing Street again, and then, once more, go back to the United States.

The Long Morning After—II: The End of an Era

HARVEY WHEELER

For years to come, the life of peoples at home and abroad will register the impact of the decision the American electorate made on November 4, 1952. This is why, to see as clearly as we can into the future, an effort must be made to evaluate the nature and the causes of the election returns. The following article is the second in a series of political analyses.

ADLAI STEVENSON may win the Presidency in 1956, but the Democratic coalition of voters that had been expected to bring him victory in 1952 no longer exists. A phase of American political history has come to an end. Just as that phase

began because of something more than the prestige of Franklin Roosevelt, so the Republican victory was made possible by forces much deeper than the popularity of General Eisenhower.

Political analysts are accustomed to attribute the electoral successes of the New Deal and Fair Deal to a coalition composed of seven components of the population: labor, small Southern farmers, racial and ethnic minorities, low-salaried white-collar workers, urban Catholics, city machines, and intellectuals. The analysts generally agree that these components were held together not only by Roosevelt's dynamic personality but, more importantly, by the

forces of depression and all-out war.

Firmly based on these voting blocs, the New Deal could achieve victory over and over again by defending the nation against two great enemies: depression and fascism. Each in turn was dramatized as the greatest threat to one or another of the groups of interests that made up the Roosevelt coalition.

OF THE six main components of the old Roosevelt coalition, only three remained intact last November. These were the urban Negroes, the marginal South, and the union strongholds. The numerical defeat was bad enough for the Democrats, but even worse is the fact that not



Thomas E. Dewey

one of these groups gives promise of being able to spark a revival of cohesive and crusading liberalism in the near future. Rather, each of these three basic components is losing political and social importance.

The American Negro is slowly emerging into a relatively enhanced social position. Obviously nothing yet achieved warrants complacency, but even liberal Negro leaders must realize that if they succeed in improving the Negro's social and economic status, they will at the same time succeed in making him become more conservative and accordingly less likely to identify himself with a liberal political movement. Many a depressed group that had initially supported liberal policies in order to improve its lot became disaffected from liberalism when it thought that its interests had been satisfied.

The South presents a different picture, but generally the Republicans have made their heaviest gains in the newly industrialized areas. In this last election the Democrats won mostly in the marginal wastelands of the South, which are certain sooner or later to be at least partly industrialized. When this hap-

pens, there is a chance that the Republicans, rather than the Democrats, will benefit.

And finally, the labor unions, which under the New Deal managed to furnish political leadership for a large segment of the old coalition, were in 1952 a declining, or at least static, social component. Total union membership has been falling off for some years. But even more important is the *proportionate* union decline in relation to other groups in our population.

Catholic Defection?

But if the picture is discouraging from the Democrats' point of view when we look at the *strongest* remaining components of the old coalition, it is very dark indeed when we study those in which Republican inroads were deepest. It was only during the days of the New Deal that American Catholics became a politically major element of our population rather than an underprivileged minority. During the New Deal years, a moneyed Catholic elite came to the fore, backed in part by Catholic influence within the Democratic Party.

Of course, many Catholics never felt completely at home with the intellectuals who flocked to the banner of the New Deal, and this uneasiness accounted for one of the inner weaknesses of the New Deal coalition. Yet both groups were indispensable to the New Deal. The intellectuals were the tacticians of the struggle against depression and fascism. From the Catholics came some of the people who best knew how to deliver the vote on Election Day.

When the war against fascism gave way to the war against Communism, some Catholics were subjected to conflicting pulls. In addition to their position in the Democratic Party, the Catholics had by this time also come to form one of the largest components of the American labor movement. In both party and union, the Catholic frequently had found himself cautioned against all-out anti-Communism by the New Deal intellectuals. But when the enemy was no longer fascism but Communism, the American Catholic felt more inclined to follow the anti-



Harry S. Truman

Communist teachings of his own clerical hierarchy.

To keep Catholics loyal to the party, the Democratic high command resorted to "grants-in-aid" in the form of overt, and sometimes gross, patronage preference. Even this, however, was a short-run and self-defeating measure, for it contributed to a stabilization of Catholics as a "have" rather than "have-not" group in the political community and thus added to the forces pulling Catholics away from the New Deal.

MEANWHILE, something else was going on within the great city bastions of the Democratic machines. There have been many descriptions of how the immigrant masses, mostly of peasant stock, mostly from eastern Europe, and mostly Catholic, received with their naturalization certificates a political power for which they had been unprepared. These upshерded flocks of voters were crying for guidance and organization. They received both, and quickly—usually from Irish politicians.

The great strength of the big-city bosses lasted only as long as there were large immigrant groups to

bring into the community. By the end of the first quarter of the twentieth century, when mass immigration stopped and when most of the previous immigrants had become assimilated into the fabric of American institutions, the big-city bosses saw the handwriting on the wall—and did their best to erase it. They toyed halfheartedly with the Negro vote, but the insecurities of their own groups plus the distrust of the Negroes prevented them from making much progress. They gained some respite from the depression, and in some areas they went strongly into labor politics. In many cases they developed profitable liaisons with organized crime, purchasing a last spell of power.

But all these expedients were doomed. The big-city boss of the old-fashioned variety was finished.

The New Bosses

There were other reasons for the decline of the bosses. In the old-fashioned city machine, with its bull-necked, cigar-chewing ward heelers, there was a rule that each party regular had to control from six to ten votes. The boss had only to build a faithful organization of such regulars and a small, well-organized group could easily control both primaries and elections. But nowadays such horse-and-buggy politics will no longer do. Today the precinct leader must be at least ten times as effective as the old-time ward heeler if he wishes to play politics in earnest. Each precinct worker in our day must control from sixty to a hundred votes.



The place of the old-fashioned habitués of smoke-filled rooms is being taken by a new kind of boss. This new boss must appeal to new kinds of voters. He must use new kinds of election techniques. He must employ slick public-relations men. He must appear effectively on television. He must employ expert research staffs to help him design both his public statements and his organizational strategy. Between elections his organization must be kept oiled and operating among his constituents. Just before Election Day he must move into his wards and precincts with efficient electoral detachments trained in the job of putting a maximum number of voters through the polling booths.

To win, these new leaders have had to fight the old bosses on their home grounds. This they have done, and American politics will never again be the same. Men have emerged like Thomas E. Dewey, Estes Kefauver, Alfred Driscoll, Henry Schricker, Hubert Humphrey, G. Mennen Williams, Theodore R. McKeldin, George Smathers, and Adlai Stevenson. Of course no one of these men—with the possible exception of Dewey—is a perfect embodiment of the type. But the important point is that in almost every case they came to power as vote-getting reformers who defeated an entrenched machine by organizing a newer and better one.

When they struck, the older bosses hardly knew what had hit them. It was perfectly natural that the Republicans, who had the great urban Democratic machines to defeat, perceived ahead of the rest of the country that the old formulas simply would not work any more. Under leaders like Dewey, they formed the associations and developed the programs which could diminish the hold of the Democrats on urban Catholics, the big-city machines, and labor. They were also ready to gamble that in a showdown with the older elements around Taft they could come out victorious.

Democrats, Old and New

The story in the Democratic Party is surprisingly similar. Oddly enough, it was Harry Truman himself who formalized the transition between



Walter Reuther

the old and the new. It was Harry Truman, former protégé of the Pendergast machine, who named as heir-apparent the shy intellectual from Springfield, Illinois. It was this same Harry Truman who in 1948 had the effrontery to think he could win the Presidency. Everyone, including the Democratic bosses, knew he was wrong. Many of them didn't even bother to go to Philadelphia. Most of those who did go didn't even attend the Convention proceedings. And there stood Mr. Truman patiently in the wings, waiting hours for the nomination no one else thought was worth as much as a plugged nickel.

But the point is that Harry Truman ran the show himself, largely without the bosses. And because the bosses had abdicated, a young upstart like Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota could introduce a civil-rights motion from the floor and actually have it carried!

Also active in that Convention



Estes Kefauver

were the newer labor bosses—men who hoped in their own cities to wrest organizational power from the old Democratic bosses. These newer men did not win an outright victory in Philadelphia in 1948, but they did show such strength that the party and the country realized that they had a monopoly on whatever dynamism was left to the Democrats.

Adlai Stevenson's campaign reflected this split between the new and the old. One organization of the bright young intellectuals he kept with him in Springfield. The other, with a new head, he set up in Washington to deal with the old-time Democratic organization. But before the end his intellectuals came to terms with the old-timers just as they had done previously at the Chicago Convention. However, the breach could not be filled so easily.

THE LABOR unions held fast to the Democratic Party pretty well throughout the postwar period. During the dynamic early days of CIO expansion, rank-and-file union mem-

bers tended to engage actively in politics. However, as times got better the unionization fight lost its glamour and its dynamism. Rank-and-file participation in both union and party politics fell off drastically. Political analysts began to question whether the labor vote was in any sense "deliverable."

We know now from rather precise studies of working-class families that this surprising political apathy among laborers could come from disappointment in their leaders. This is not to say that the unions failed entirely. On the contrary, since the Second World War they have made steady gains in such union centers as Detroit and West Virginia.

From 1946 on, the Democrats saw in the labor vote their main hope for continued power. Their reaction was to try to hold onto the labor vote by distributing favorable wage concessions. The result of this policy was total failure. It failed to solidify the labor vote, and it succeeded only in alienating other significant segments of the population.

Every Man a Bureaucrat

The magazines *Fortune*, *Time*, and *Life* have long shown how numerous the managerial class has become. Indeed, these three journals may be said to be deliberately slanted toward (a) executives, (b) "middle management," and (c) white-collar workers. It is from among this latter white-collar category, the consumers of *Life* and *Reader's Digest* and deserters from the Democratic Party, that the 1952 six-to-five margin of G.O.P. victory may have found many of its recruits.

For a long time in this country we have talked about the separation of ownership from control in our large corporations. It is basically this separation of ownership from control that is referred to when one mentions the "managerial revolution." And certainly it seems true that in a large number of industries the "managerial elite" have virtually taken over the direction of the businesses.

What is not so widely appreciated is that in labor unions something like the same process has been going on. The point is that unions are now run by efficient union bureaucrats rather than bearded radicals. To-

day's union executives are labor businessmen, and their job is not to man the barricades but to negotiate with their opposite numbers in the business of buying and selling labor power. The old social doctrines of a crusading labor movement no longer fit these conservative labor bureaucrats, and accordingly the pressure has been strong for them to discard the radicalism of earlier days in favor of a more conservative social outlook, which happens also to reinforce the requirements of the war against Communism in the unions.

MANAGEMENT, for its part, not having all the interests of owners, has come to view these new union managers with entirely different eyes. With the floor of the economy underwritten by government, neither labor nor management feels the old impulses to antagonism.

On the contrary, after the Second World War, for the first time in American history, labor and management were impelled together into reliable contractual relationships. What management really wants is predictably reliable and constant employment relations. Any wage increase in our officially sponsored and guaranteed seller's market easily can be passed on to the purchaser, and so the only people who lose when a raise is granted are those who cannot exert enough private or public pressure to keep their income



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abreast of the ensuing rise in the cost of living.

Among all the losers, the one who loses the most, in no matter what sector of our ever-increasing bureaucracy he happens to be employed, is the white-collar worker. He is the engineer, the teacher, the clerk, the administrator, the manager, the salesman, the shipper, the order taker, the stenographer, the business-machine operator, and so on. Since about 1920, his has been the most rapidly growing segment of our population. Even before then, the percentage of production-line workers among our gainfully employed had been declining. If we consider the growth of vast public services, the multiplication of reports, files, accounting, and office overhead now required by any firm to remain in business, we can see why bureaucratization—not only of government but also of business—has been the rule.

White-Collar Housewife

And we must remember when we speak of the women's vote that regardless of the occupations of husbands or fathers, almost all women, unless they themselves work directly at production-line jobs, are white-collar. They uniformly take their styles and behavior patterns from those who set white-collar styles. As housewives—even wives of factory husbands—they are virtually "salaried" workers, running their homes on relatively fixed, even if informal, budgets. Very often they must do the domestic bookkeeping, report filing, taxpaying, correspondence, and record keeping. In whatever type of family, the housewife is likely to be the one who takes care of the "administrative duties." In taking care of most of her chores, she tends to live and function in a white-collar world.

At any rate, even if we use a carefully restricted definition of the white-collar, fixed-income worker—limiting it to highly educated sales, distributive, professional, subprofessional, government, small-owning, clerical, and administrative workers—they still account for almost one-third of our total labor force.

For the immediate future, labor and white-collar classes will undoubtedly make up two of the larg-

est segments of the population. To be able to combine these two social blocs would undoubtedly give a political party a winning electoral combination. However, in making strategic calculations about the party politics of the future, we should not forget that it is the white-collar component that is the growing, dynamic one and the laboring component the declining one. The future organizational plans of the great political parties must become increasingly preoccupied with the interests of white-collar groups.

Educational Expansion

Of course, the growth of this vast white-collar class was greatly stimulated by the New Deal itself. Not only did the New Deal vastly increase the total number of governmental and private administrative jobs, it also produced a large increment to the white-collar class by broadening educational opportunities. This was true during the de-

pression. But it was after the anti-fascist Second World War that the G.I. Bill of Rights really expanded education for white-collar jobs. The supply of junior executives was so much greater than the demand, some argued, that these newly educated managerial masses, unable to get white-collar positions yet refusing the comparative monotony of production-line jobs, would become a center for revolutionary sentiment.

It is difficult to imagine our bureaucratic masses rushing into the winding roads of their "dormitory" suburbs, throwing up barricades in their tree-shaded avenues, and bringing the government to its knees. No, such nineteenth-century behavior obviously is not the kind of "class action" the bureaucratic masses are likely to engage in.

But if the bureaucratic masses are not revolutionary in the classic sense, neither are they necessarily the "counter-revolutionary fascists"

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that Marxist theory tends to make them. We know from the German experience that although white-collar groups became Nazi under Hitler, they had been strongly socialist before Hitler. Moreover, England is, it is said, a nation of clerks and small shopkeepers, yet England has never been characterized as a hotbed of fascism. In the United States our white-collar groups are concentrated in and around the big cities. During the New Deal the city vote from these groups was overwhelmingly Democratic, and yet during the Fair Deal the white-collar groups have shifted perceptibly away from the Democrats as they began to feel the pinch of inflation brought on by groups of interests on both sides of them—unions and management.

THE fixed-income white-collar component of the old Roosevelt coalition has thus come to wonder whether its interests are compatible with the inflation-producing fiscal policies of the Fair Deal. Although the clerical employee could understand the need for farm-support policies, he could also see that there were no compensatory salary policies for him. Even more inflammatory to the white-collar worker was the Fair Deal's official sponsorship of the many postwar union-management-negotiated wage increases resulting, of course, in higher prices. For in these cases the beneficiaries of the Fair Deal were the managerial elite above the white-collar worker and the prestige-robbing laborers of the key unions. Little wonder that among those squeezed in between, many revolted against the Fair Deal, "the Truman War," and inflation.

But he is not inevitably conservative, this insecure bureaucrat of

ours. On the contrary, as he is unlikely to gain preference from the incoming Republicans, he may quite possibly be drawn to the support of the chastened liberal wing of the Democratic Party.

1954 and 1956

Long before November 4, 1952, the coalition that had given twenty years of electoral success to the Democrats was in an advanced state of disintegration.

The farmer had been the first to waver. The big-city Democratic machines were being dethroned by the newer bosses. The shift to the war against Communism tended to splinter the American Catholic away from the Democrats. Labor unions, politically weakened by the effects of this same force on its own Catholic membership, were unable to develop an effective Election Day organization quickly enough to fill the breach opened by the decline of the bosses. And the rising bureaucratic classes, reacting against the Truman inflation, deserted the Democrats in large numbers.

Although the Democrats still have a secure hold on Negroes and some other ethnic minorities, a few labor centers, and the Deep South, it is nevertheless clear that the old Roosevelt coalition hasn't much chance of being patched up by 1956.

Certainly, the narrow G.O.P. victory of 1952 does not mean that the Republicans cannot be defeated for another twenty years. The G.O.P. hold on office is tenuous. The party, as distinguished from the Presidential candidate, made a relatively poor showing. Moreover, the trend under the New Deal hegemony was for the Administration party to show less strength in the biennial "off-year" elections than in the quadrennial Presidential elections. This might now work sufficiently in the Democrats' favor to put them back in control of Congress two years hence.

YET the Republican victory cannot be written off as a mere accident of American politics or ascribed to the popularity of a military hero.

If the Republicans make no atrocious domestic blunders, if in foreign affairs the cold war continues to monopolize our energies, and if,

finally, the struggle against Communism continues to monopolize our thoughts, then it seems likely that the Republicans will be able to benefit for some time from the breakdown of the New Deal coalition.

Moreover, it should be remembered that throughout the western world the postwar political trend has been decidedly to the Right. The irony of this is that the persistent weakening of left-of-center political forces in the nations we have assisted has been largely a result of the Fair Deal foreign policy. The Fair Dealers have suffered at home from the impact of the policies they have fostered abroad—while their domestic enemies were, with impunity and success, calling them Reds.



Henry Schricker

Bill Mauldin

Writes to Joe

Last winter Bill Mauldin was in Korea, where his old friend Joe still remains. Since Mauldin's return he has decided that Joe ought to know more about what goes on at home.

IT'S HARDER to keep up with you now that Korea isn't a big election issue any more and the war news is on the back pages again. Boy, you should have seen the papers a couple or three months ago. Maybe it's just as well you didn't see them.

It's okay now, though. They're telling us the country never had it so good, and we shouldn't expect too much from the new Administration because we've got so prosperous in the last twenty years there's not much room for improvement.

THE BIG NEWS, of course, is that Ike is here and Harry's home. Remember how Truman, the politician, was once so crazy about generals? He gave them all sorts of high government jobs. There was a time when he thought Ike was the cat's pajamas. He sure got cured of that the hard way. And Truman put up with MacArthur so long that the

Yalu Kid practically had to insult Margaret's singing before the boss really got sore at him.

Ike, the general, on the other hand, is gone on tycoons. Somebody gave him an honorary membership in the enlightened millionaires' club (an enlightened millionaire is one who believes we should try to reduce income taxes by parliamentary



procedure before resorting to violence), and now the new President is filling the Administration with coupon clippers and car salesmen and they're going to show him how to run things like a factory. Economy and efficiency is the word.

HOWEVER, Joe, just so you won't get the idea I'm picking on old Ike before he's even had a chance to show his stuff, I will say that I think bringing all these businessmen into the government will be a real economy measure in some ways. In each case where a bribe-taking Democrat is replaced by the Republican who used to bribe him, it will mean the new man can hold onto his money.

Well, Harry liked his generals, Ike likes his tycoons, and maybe



'E' for Efficiency

some day we'll get for President a tycoon who puts politicians in government work. That would be a funny sight. It would be like getting a blacksmith to shoe a horse.

I'M SORRY to hear you missed Ike while he was in Korea. I must say it's your own fault, though, running up to the front and sitting in a fox-hole waiting for him to come down the line shaking hands with everybody. Sure, he said he was going over to see how the boys were doing, but you forgot that what looks like a three- or four-star general to you looks like one of the boys to him. Anyway, there were some pictures of him eating lunch outdoors with soldiers in reserve some miles behind the line, and you'll agree that that's far enough up front for a man with Nixon for his Vice-President.

BY THE WAY, since it was a magazine man who cooked up the idea of Ike's Korea trip, I don't know why I can't submit ideas too. My thought is how to make Korea more bearable if his three-day cure doesn't work. I just found out that during the Mexican War women were allowed to join the U.S. Army as laundresses, one laundress per twenty men.

YOU ask how the new cars look. The chrome is thinner but they spread it around more. A couple of new models use paint just for trim. The automobile casualty list for last year is in now, but I won't talk about that because I don't want to horrify you over there.

Regards,
BILL



CHANNELS:

Comments on TV

MARYA MANNES

ED MURROW's show on CBS Sunday evenings from 6:30 to 7:00, "See It Now," is about 15.8 on the Nielsen Rating. That is much lower than the 33.7 for "general variety shows," considerably lower than Roy Rogers at 36.7, who appears at the same time, and almost a point lower than Walter Winchell, who is on for half of this period. Thus the public appraisal of television's most adult, most intelligent, and (in these ways) most exciting show.

Disorder of the Day

I offer this as part of a pattern not new but increasing: the American distaste for thought. The pattern includes the fact that over six million copies of the books of Mickey Spillane were sold last year and that a prevailing concept is that an oath makes a man loyal.

Mr. Spillane is a word factory of brute sex and violence, proudly barren of thought; and "general variety shows" means those package vaudeville shows, bolstered and often ruined by one Name, which demand least of the intelligence. The list could be swelled by data on the sales of comic books, by the illiteracy of most American high-school students, and by the monstrous crime rate. They all point to the triumph of sensation over thought. Emotion is the order—or should one say disorder?—of the day.

INADVERTENTLY, I think, Murrow's wonderful shows on December 28 and January 3—"Christmas in Korea"—brought out another part of this pattern. In them several G.I.s were asked what they thought of the war. One said, "I don't see the sense in it." Another said, "I think it's a bunch of nonsense." They were quite sincere in their ignorance of the



war's purpose, and most Americans probably applauded their answers as mirroring their own frustration and impatience. The Korean hills looked indescribably desolate, the air bitterly cold, and no one with any compassion could fail to share the G.I.s' enormous distaste for the war and for the need of fighting it.

Then the camera skipped to a group of French soldiers warming their hands over a small fire, and Larry Lesueur asked one of them what he thought of the war. The man—a most typical Frenchman, dark, alert, mobile—gave that shrug which in its satiric fatalism is the national salute, and said, in effect: "I don't see how we can finish this war. If we go north we will be near

China and that will not finish the war . . . But we must stay and fight, fight . . . We cannot go back."

"Why?" he was asked. "Because," the Frenchman said, with no sententiousness but very simply, as if it would be apparent to a child, "because we are fighting for liberty—for the liberty of all the people." His weariness of the war was as great as the Americans' but he knew why he was fighting it. Presumably he had read the papers. Obviously he had used his mind.

Now it is more than possible that the two G.I.s who thought the war made no sense were not typical; there was indeed a third who said: "We got to stop Communism before it gets to the U.S." The U.S. Army is full of intelligent men who must know what the war is about. It is also possible that another Frenchman would merely have shrugged; the French are not all intellectual giants.

Heads: Pointed vs. Egg

Yet it is my contention that we are becoming proud of ignorance, and that if a G.I. had said exactly what the Frenchman had said, with his hopelessness and his sense of duty, he might well have been branded an egghead and a sucker by his fellows. Stick to "Hello, Mom" and the comic books and Mickey Spillane, and leave the rest to foreigners and long-hairs.



A Hardy Breed— The American Reformer

HILLEL BERNSTEIN

RENDEZVOUS WITH DESTINY: A HISTORY OF MODERN AMERICAN REFORM, by Eric F. Goldman. Knopf. \$5.

A HISTORY of American Reform is particularly timely now, when the word "Reform" has fallen under a peculiar opprobrium despite the everlasting fact that the United States was created and made great by reformers, and that Reform has always been a propelling force in the American character. Indeed, there are efforts nowadays to label the slightest move toward Reform as foreign, sinister, and you-know-what, as if instigated by the examples of such pinkos as Thomas Jefferson, William Jennings Bryan, Ignatius Donnelly, Theodore Roosevelt, Robert La Follette, Tom L. Johnson, Father John Augustine Ryan, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Harry S. Truman.

As for Reform itself, although the word is not used out loud, its function and exercise seem to have become, temporarily, the exclusive property of Congressmen and their committees investigating everything and each other between elections.

HERE, then, is *Rendezvous with Destiny*, which comes appropriately to tell us the deeds of the American reformers from the Grant to the Truman Administrations. The author is an associate professor of history at Princeton University. The materials and research with which he had to cope are prodigious, and might well have overpowered the theme, but fortunately they have been fused into a spirited and informative narrative—almost a blow-by-blow account of the battles, victories, and setbacks.

Here is the aristocratic Samuel J. Tilden breaking down the giant graftor Tweed, and Bob La Follette

fighting his battles against entrenched privilege. Here is Mayor Tom L. Johnson of Cleveland turning his back on his traction millions, fighting the traction magnates, and giving his city an administration of honesty and Reform it had not dreamed possible. Here are those outstandingly dedicated patrician reformers, the two Roosevelts; the agrarian Populist reformers like Ignatius Donnelly, Tom Watson, and William Jennings Bryan; the idea men like Henry George, Edward Bellamy, and Herbert Croly; the labor groups like Powderly's Knights of Labor, Gompers's AFL, Lewis's and Murray's CIO; and all the crises and pains of a growing nation—pains of inequity, lagging social justice, and racial and religious distinctions.

From 'Man Milliners' to 'Pinkos'
The story is by no means all eulogy, for Mr. Goldman plays no favorites either with facts or persons, and where an Achilles has a heel—or becomes one—this historian always notes it. One type of reformer fought only municipal corruption and machine politicians but remained indifferent to the national encroachments of trusts. Agrarian Populist reformers, despite their leader Bryan, paid little more than lip service to the causes of industrial labor. Some labor leaders worked for the exclusiveness of craft unions rather than for the general amelioration of labor conditions. Some later Reform intellectuals fell prey to Soviet dialectical strife and totalitarian corruption. The sum total, however, as presented in this book, is a vastly comprehensive and continuously engrossing tribute to the deeply American spirit and institution of Reform.

There are facts for everybody,



and hundreds of stirring incidents and pungent quotations to keep the story moving and alive as it goes chronologically through the decades.

It is interesting to know, for example, that the first American political use of the word "liberal" was made by the Liberal Republicans who organized in order to fight the corruption of the Grant Administration—"Out with Grantism!" There was also another McCarthy in Wisconsin—Charles—who was one of the chief architects of the "Wisconsin Idea" of Progressivism and who led the anti-trust fight among T.R.'s Bull Moosers. Just as today, the earlier opponents of Reform had their derogatory appellations for the reformers. The 1870s' equivalent for today's "pinky" was "man milliner." But the "man milliners" proved to be more tenacious and effective fighters than those who jeered them.

'Dante Is Dead'

The book is so packed with quotable things that it is unfair to favor any of them. However, this reviewer would cite the example of Mrs. Sarah P. Decker, who in 1904 "took her ample self to the rostrum of the General Federation of Women's Clubs, turned a carefully coiffured head to the delegates, and said: 'Ladies, you have chosen me your leader. Well, I have an important piece of news to give you. Dante is dead. He has been dead for several centuries, and I think it is time we dropped the study of his *Inferno* and turned our attention to our own.'"

Then, back in the 1900's there was the Reverend Mr. Williams of Cleveland, explaining patiently to a clerical colleague interested more in "vice" than in basic Reform that Mayor Tom Johnson in his program

was "trying, not to enforce Christianity, but to make it possible."

And the kingmaker Mark Hanna, mourning President McKinley's assassination and lamenting that it had brought Vice-President Theodore Roosevelt to the Presidency. "I told William McKinley it was a mistake to nominate that wild man at Philadelphia," Hanna growled. "I asked him if he realized what would happen if he should die. Now look, that damned cowboy is President of the United States."

There was also Father Ryan, fighting reactionaries year after year in and outside the Church and insisting that the responsibilities of Catholicism changed with changing economic circumstances. "After Ryan had been hurling the *Rerum Novarum* at his enemies for years, a reform-minded rabbi achieved a masterpiece of superfluity by saying to the priest: 'You have a very great advantage over men in my position. . . . You can hang your "radical" utterances on a Papal encyclical.'"

Since the inherent independence of the American character will not let itself be denied permanently, Reform, under whatever name, will continue to express itself, come McCarran or McCarthy.

BOOK NOTES

REPORT ON THE AMERICAN COMMUNIST, by Morris L. Ernst and David Loth. Holt. \$3.

IN THIS report based on talks with ex-Communists, there is—almost necessarily—more fiction than fact. An ex-Communist telling about Communists is not like a Communist telling about Communists. The perspective has changed; the faith and ardor are missing; the temptation to reconstruct is irresistible.

The authors regard Communists as people and not as political figureheads: "There are no characteristics which mark them as totally different from other Americans." So far so good. The idea that there is such a thing as a "Communist type" is a most pernicious fable. It makes the problem altogether too simple. For if there is a Communist type, then anyone not of that type is immune. The Communist movement, however, is vast precisely because it ap-

peals to many different types at many levels. Unfortunately Ernst and Loth are not entirely consistent on this point. By the end of the book they are writing, "communism always has appealed to the same type of people."

In general the Communist movement is portrayed as a haven for the neurotic middle class. The motiva-



tions for joining and leaving the party are supposed to be psychological and emotional. Sex is stressed. Here is the generalization of the typical Communist home: "They have been brought up . . . in comfort and often in luxury. They are the children of professional men or more than usually successful businessmen, bankers, and ministers." This would be an important discovery, if it were true.

No one reading this book would imagine that two wars and a great depression could make Communists. War is not mentioned at all, and there is only a single, incidental mention of the depression. In this book people do not seem to have minds, but only emotions and psyches. Admittedly people do not become Communists for intellectual reasons only—but is it not possible to overstate the other side?

SWORD AND SWASTIKA, by Telford Taylor. Simon and Schuster. \$5.

THIS STUDY of Hitler's first six years in power, from the fall of the Weimar Republic to the invasion of Poland, is concerned with his Wehrmacht generals and his Nazi followers, with little attention to economic and other factors. Brigadier General Telford Taylor was chief counsel for the prosecution

at the Nuremberg trials. He has, of course, availed himself of some of the Nuremberg material, but he has also made use of such important unpublished records as General Halder's and General von Blomberg's diaries. The sword is emphasized here more than the swastika. General Taylor probably took it for granted that the scoundrelism of the Nazis was self-evident and that he could contribute more by exposing the true role of the military. Even the "good" generals, like Fritsch and Beck, get relatively little sympathy from him. The political effect of the book is to act as a kind of counterweight against the postwar attempt to rehabilitate the German Army by salvaging the reputations of a few generals like Fritsch, Beck, and Rommel, who at various times were forced in some measure to "resist" Hitler.

ANNAPOURNA, by Maurice Herzog. Dutton. \$5.

ANNAPURNA is the highest mountain (26,493 feet) ever scaled by man. Herzog, leader of a French Himalayan expedition, and his companion, Louis Lachenal, held the tricolor for a brief moment one day in 1950 against the merciless wind at Annapurna's summit. This illustrated book is Herzog's account of an achievement for which he almost paid with his life. Intravenous injections—they were agonizing—restored the circulation in his arms and legs; the expedition's doctor amputated his fingers; his comrades and the native guides carried him down to the base camp; he dictated this extraordinary story from a hospital bed in Paris. He tries to tell why he wanted to climb the mountain and what it means to him to have climbed it: "In our youth we had not been misled by fantasies, nor by the bloody battles of modern warfare which feed the imagination of the young. For us the mountains had been a natural field of activity where, playing on the frontiers of life and death, we had found the freedom for which we were blindly groping and which was as necessary to us as bread." As with other explorers, Herzog's explanations do not explain.

